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INTRODUCTION
F EW issues have proved as controversial in recent years as the
question of how America should respond to the tragedy of
apartheid in South Africa. Apartheid is utterly repugnant, brutally
inhumane, and contrary to America's most fundamental notions of
human rights and dignity. Whether people should oppose
apartheid has an obvious answer. How people should oppose
apartheid is the difficult question.
One way to oppose apartheid is to attempt to persuade United
States corporations that have operations in South Africa to with-
draw from the country.' Some view divestment-selling stock in
companies that fail to adhere to an articulated standard of socially
acceptable behavior-as an effective way to influence corporate ac-
tions. Others believe divestment is morally compelled even if cor-
porate behavior is not influenced.2 Whatever their motive, those
I Corporate withdrawal is proceeding apace at this time. See infra note 21.
2 This viewpoint asserts that owning stock in United States corporations with opera-
tions in South Africa is tantamount to condoning apartheid. Therefore, the only proper
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who ask trustee-investors' to divest are requesting fiduciaries to im-
pose political and social constraints on their investment decisions,
instead of basing their decisions solely on the risk and return char-
acteristics of the particular investments. This request raises a sub-
stantial legal question: whether the trustee-investor violates his
fiduciary duties if his investment decisions are based on political or
social criteria.4
"Social investing," as it is called, has received considerable schol-
arly attention. Most of the legal commentaries have examined so-
course of conduct is to break all ties with the corporations, even if no tangible benefits
will result. For an overview of the practical and moral questions raised by divestment,
see Jerry, U.S. Colleges and the Response to Apartheid, Chron. of Higher Educ., Apr. 3,
1985, at 88.
3 A trustee-investor is one who invests property held in trust for the benefit of an-
other. A "trust" is a fiduciary relationship with respect to property whereby the person
who has title to the property (the trustee) is obligated to deal with the property for the
benefit of another. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 2-3 (1959). The con-
cept of "fiduciary" is very broad; it exists whenever one person is under a duty to act for
the benefit of another as to matters within the scope of the relationship. Common fidu-
ciary relationships are trustee and beneficiary, guardian and ward, agent and principal,
and attorney and client. See id. § 2 comment b.
4 The question of the legality of social investing can arise only when the trustee-inves-
tor makes an investment decision about which the beneficiary or the trustor (the person
who puts the property in trust) does not receive full disclosure and to which the benefi-
ciary or trustor does not consent. If the beneficiary and trustor give express consent, the
decision is either authorized or ratified, depending on whether the consent is given
before or after the investment decision. If neither the beneficiary nor the trustor objects
to the decision, the question of the validity of the trustee's action will not arise. Yet,
investor-trustees, because of the potential of personal liability, avoid taking action that
might later be subject to legal challenge. Therefore, they are not likely to undertake a
social investing strategy without first considering the potential legal ramifications.
5 See, e.g., 3 A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 227.17 (3d ed. Supp. 1985);
Langbein, Social Investing of Pension Funds and University Endowments: Unprincipled,
Futile, and Illegal, in J. LANGBEIN, SCHOTLAND & BLAUSTEIN, DISINVESTMENT: Is
IT LEGAL? Is IT MORAL? Is IT PRODUCTIVE? 1 (1985) [hereinafter J. LANGBEIN];
Dobris, Arguments in Favor of Fiduciary Divestment of "South African" Securities, 65
NEB. L. REV. 209 (1986); Ennis & Parkhill, South African Divestment: Social Responsi-
bility or Fiduciary Folly?, 42 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 30 (July-Aug. 1986); Hutchinson &
Cole, Legal Standards Governing Investment of Pension Assets for Social and Political
Goals, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1340 (1980); Langbein & Posner, Social Investing and the
Law of Trusts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 72 (1980); Lanoff, The Social Investment of Private
Pension Plan Assets: May It Be Done Lawfully Under ERISA?, 31 LAB. L.J. 387 (1980);
Lynn, Investing Pension Funds for Social Goals Requires Changing the Law, 53 U.
COLO. L. REV. 101 (1981); Murphy, Regulating Public Employee Retirement Systems
for Portfolio Efficiency, 67 MINN. L. REV. 211 (1982); Pederson, Divestment of Securi-
ties in Companies Doing Business in South Africa: Conflicting Moral and Legal Impera-
tives, INQUIRY & ANALYSIS 1 (Jan. 1986); Posner, Law and the Theory of Finance:
Some Intersections, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 159, 171-73 (1986); Ravikoff & Curzan,
Social Responsibility in Investment Policy and the Prudent Man Rule, 68 CALIF. L. REV.
518 (1980); Schotland, Should Pension Funds be Used to Achieve "Social" Change? (pts.
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cial investing without reference to the body of empirical research on
its practical implications. These abstract analyses have reached
mixed conclusions as to the permissibility of social investing. 6 Dur-
ing the past few years, various financial researchers have explored
the extent to which a social investing strategy may adversely affect
the profitability and riskiness of a portfolio.7 It is now appropriate
to examine those results in conjunction with the legal rules that
1, 2 & 3), TRUSTS & ESTATES 10 (Sept. 1980), TRUSTS & ESTATES 27 (Oct. 1980),
TRUSTS & ESTATES 26 (Nov. 1980); Troyer, Slocombe, & Boisture, Divestment of South
Africa Investments: The Legal Implications for Foundations, Other Charitable Institu-
tions, and Pension Funds, 74 GEo. L.J. 127 (1985); Comment, Nontraditional Invest-
ments of Fiduciaries: Re-examining the Prudent Investor Rule, 33 EMORY L.J. 1067
(1984); Note, Socially Responsible Investment of Public Pension Funds: The South Af-
rica Issue and State Law, 10 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 407 (1980-81); Note,
Fiduciary Responsibility: Prudent Investments Under ERISA, 14 SUFFOLK U.L. REV.
1066 (1980); Comment, The South African Divestment Debate: Factoring "Political
Risk" into the Prudent Investor Rule, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 201 (1986); Note, Divestiture
Resolutions: University Director Liability Under the Emerging Corporate Standard, 15
U.S.F. L. REV. 261 (1980-81).
6 Compare Ravikoff & Curzan, supra note 5, at 519 ("existing case law, though quite
sparse, can be read to permit [trustee pursuit of nontraditional investment objectives at
the expense of adequate return and corpus safety]") and 3 A. ScoT-r, supra note 5,
§ 227.17, which states,
Trustees in deciding whether to invest in, or to retain, the securities of a cor-
poration may properly consider the social performance of the corporation.
They may decline to invest in, or to retain, the securities of corporations
whose activities or some of them are contrary to fundamental and generally
accepted ethical principles,
with Langbein, Social Investing of Pension Funds and University Endowments: Unprinci-
pled, Futile, and Illegal, in J. LANGBEIN, supra note 5, at 16 ("A trustee who sacrifices
the beneficiary's financial well-being for any social cause violates both his duty of loy-
alty to the beneficiary and his duty of prudence in investment") and Murphy, supra note
5, at 259, who states,
Governmental control of public retirement plans should seek the maximiza-
tion of financial return on the investment of funds assets within a risk level
which is appropriate to the fulfillment of the financial purposes of the pension
system. In short, efficiency in the selection of an investment portfolio should
be the sole objective of pension fund regulation.
For legal commentaries making some reference to the empirical research, see infra note
8.
7 See Grossman & Sharpe, Financial Implications of South African Divestment, 42
FIN. ANALYSTS J. 15 (July-Aug. 1986); Investor Responsibility Research Center, Inc.,
The Impact of South Africa-Related Divestment on Equity Portfolio Performance (Jan.
1985) [hereinafter IRRC Report] (summary and evaluation of nine different studies);
Rudd, Divestment of South African Equities: How Risky?, 6 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 5-10
(Spr. 1979); Sutton, Gustavson, & Trieschmann, Portfolio Performance Using Social In-
vestment Strategies. Some Empirical Evidence, 3 J. OF INS. REG. 30 (Sept. 1984); Wag-
ner, Emkin & Dixon, South African Divestment: The Investment Issues, 40 FIN.
ANALYSTS J. 14 (Nov.-Dec. 1984).
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limit the investment discretion of trustee-investors.8 This Article
reconsiders these rules in light of what is known about the effect of
South Africa divestment on portfolio performance.9
Part I of this Article defines social investing and briefly reviews
the South Africa divestment movement which has brought ques-
tions about the legality of social investing to the fore. Part II com-
ments upon existing statutory and common law limitations on the
discretion of trustee-investors to adopt policies of social investing.
Part III analyzes the empirical research on the extent to which pre-
clusion of a set of investment opportunities may impair the per-
formance of a typical trustee-investor's portfolio, both with respect
to rate of return and risk. Part IV explores the implications of the
empirical evidence analyzed in Part III for the legal standards sur-
veyed in Part II. We conclude that it is neither necessary nor ap-
propriate to apply the legal standards limiting fiduciary discretion
so as to prohibit social investing strategies no more restrictive than
one requiring divestment of all stocks held in any company doing
business in South Africa.
8 J. LANGBEIN, supra note 5, briefly discusses "the economics of social investing."
However, this discussion contains no empirical evidence to validate the conclusion that
the only possible outcomes from a social investing strategy are both "futile" and
"wealth-impairing." Id. at 12-16. Langbein and Posner are responsible for the most
significant effort to date to integrate economic and legal analysis. See Langbein & Pos-
ner, supra note 5. The authors' 1980 article provides an excellent analysis of the eco-
nomic relationships involved in the social investing calculus. Unfortunately, the
empirical substantiation for their conclusions is sketchy, largely because the authors did
not have access to the research published subsequent to their article. See id. at 83-96.
In a 1986 essay on the same subject, Posner, supra note 5, referred to the 1984 Wagner,
Emkin and Dixon study, supra note 7, but even this recent essay predates the publica-
tion of significant financial research. Troyer, Slocombe and Boisture, supra note 5, at
138-40, cite some of the finance literature but explicitly decline to express an opinion on
the financial effect of divestment, simply noting that views on the subject are diverse.
Pederson, supra note 5, contains a brief discourse on modern portfolio theory but makes
no reference to the available empirical research. Hutchinson and Cole, supra note 5,
briefly note some of the early studies and recognize their implications for the legal stan-
dards, but the commentators, by their own admission, do not explore the precise signifi-
cance of the studies. See id. at 1386.
9 In this Article, we express no opinion on the merit (or lack thereof) of any particu-
lar social investing strategy, including South Africa divestment. Rather, we recommend
a modification of the law which currently requires that the donor-trustor specifically
insist that the trustee follow a social investing strategy. In its place, we offer a rule
which would require the donor-trustor who wishes that the trustee not follow a social
investing strategy to specifically insist that such a strategy not be implemented. Under
this revised rule, absent the imposition of such a restriction on the trustee's discretion
by the donor-trustor, the trustee would be free, subject to constraints discussed more
fully in Part III and Part IV, to implement a social investing strategy.
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SOCIAL INVESTING AND SOUTH AFRICA DIVESTMENT
The term "social investing" was aptly defined by Professors
Langbein and Posner as "excluding the securities of certain other-
wise attractive companies from an investor's portfolio because the
companies are judged to be socially irresponsible, and including the
securities of certain otherwise unattractive companies because they
are judged to be behaving in a socially laudable way."10 As these
authors stated, "The reader will not go far wrong if he understands
social investing to be pursuit of an investment strategy that tempers
the conventional objective of maximizing the investor's financial in-
terests by seeking to promote nonfinancial social goals as well.""1
Social investing is either negative or positive. In its positive form,
the investor chooses to invest only in certain kinds of companies,
effectively targeting certain investments for social reasons. An in-
vestor's decision to purchase only the stock of local companies be-
cause of their beneficial effect on local employment is an example of
positive social investing. In its negative form the investor begins
with an unconstrained, diverse portfolio and identifies those compa-
nies in which he will not invest due to their disfavored social poli-
cies. The South Africa divestment movement, which calls for
avoiding companies with ties to South Africa, primarily addresses
the conduct of managers of large, diversified funds. Thus, South
Africa divestment is an example of negative social investing.
Although the divestment campaign sparked by the debate over
South African apartheid and the role of American companies that
do business in that nation is unparalleled in significance, earlier ex-
amples of social investing strategies do exist. In the 1930s, Wiscon-
sin enacted a statute requiring that at least seventy percent of all
trust monies be invested within Wisconsin. The statute was repealed
in 1945, however. 2 In the 1960s, Congress considered legislation
that would have required private pension funds to invest a percent-
age of their assets in low- and middle-income housing and to pursue
10 Langbein & Posner, supra note 5, at 73. This definition necessarily excludes social
share voting from the scope of the inquiry, as well as the question of whether corpora-
tions should behave in a socially responsible manner.
11 Id.
12 See schotland, Should Pension Funds Be Used to Achieve "Social" Goals?, TRUSTS
& ESTATES (pt. 1) 10, 11 (Sept. 1980). The Wisconsin statute, purposely designed to
support local interests, prioritized small loans on improved farm property, loans to co-




"socially responsible" investments."3 In the early 1970s, union rep-
resentatives and consumer advocates urged Congress to allow pen-
sion fund managers to invest a portion of fund assets in socially
useful enterprises. " In 1979, the United Auto Workers negotiated
a three-year labor contract with the Chrysler Corporation which
allowed up to ten percent of new pension contributions to be in-
vested in "socially desirable projects."15 Currently, at least thirteen
mutual funds claim to adhere to social investment strategies.
16
These funds have no unusual fiduciary difficulties because the inves-
tor consents to the social investing strategy-and whatever possible
gains or losses that strategy entails-when depositing money with
the fund.
Although apartheid has provoked the most significant interest
ever in social investing, divestment is but a small aspect of the
larger debate over how the United States should respond to
apartheid. The most important debate in the United States today
focuses upon the substance of U.S. foreign policy. The Reagan Ad-
ministration has encouraged the dismantling of apartheid through a
policy of "constructive engagement."' 7 Dissatisfaction with the in-
effectiveness of that policy led to calls for the imposition of sanc-
tions upon South Africa. In October 1986, Congress enacted
sanctions, overriding President Reagan's veto.'" If conditions in
13 Id.
14See Hutchinson & Cole, supra note 5, at 1343-44.
15 Langbein & Posner, supra note 5, at 72.
16 Wall St. J,., Aug. 5, 1986, at 33, col. 4. Between 1982 and 1986, the six largest
social investing funds grew from $102 million in assets from 22,000 investors, to $450
million in assets from 66,000 investors. TIME, Oct. 27, 1986, at 74, col. 3.'According to
one recent estimate, over $350 billion is currently invested in "socially screened" securi-
ties. Capital Dist. Bus. Rev., Nov. 2, 1987, § 1, at 20 (citing Social Investment Forum,
a Boston-based professional association of brokers, bankers, and analysts).
17 See Crocker, Reagan Administration's Africa Policy: A Progress Report, 84 DEPT.
ST. BULL. 38, 43-44 (Jan. 1984). This policy is widely perceived as a failure. See Wall
St. J., Jan. 12, 1987, at 28, col. I (reporting that meeting between Secretary of State
Shultz and Oliver Tambo, head of the African National Congress, "marks the failure of
an old policy, not the beginning of a new one"); Lugar, Promoting True Democracy in
South Africa, Bus. & Soc'Y REV. 7 (Spring 1986) (concept of constructive engagement
was good but implementation was not); Wolpe, The Double Standard of American For-
eign Policy, Bus. & Soc'Y REV. 12, 13-14 (Spring 1986) (constructive engagement has
had counterproductive consequences in South Africa and for U.S. interests).
18 Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 5001-5116 (Supp.
1987). This legislation banned all new investments and bank loans to South Africa,
made it unlawful to import uranium, coal, iron, steel, and other designated products
produced in South Africa, placed an embargo on the export of oil, oil products, and
munitions to South Africa, and restricted the landing rights of South African airlines.
See generally UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SOUTH AFRICA STA-
OREGON LAW REVIEW
South Africa do not improve, tougher sanctions, perhaps including
the mandated withdrawal of American business interests still pres-
ent in South Africa,19 are likely to be proposed.
A second arena of debate is the corporate boardroom. As condi-
tions worsen in South Africa, corporate managements argue over
whether to remain in the country or depart (i.e., "disinvest"). 20
This debate, of course, would be moot if the federal government
were to require the termination of all business dealings in and with
South Africa. However, it is not likely that either the President or
Congress will soon mandate the termination of all economic ties
with South Africa. The current trend definitely favors voluntary
corporate withdrawal from South Africa: thirty-nine United States
companies pulled out of South Africa in 1985, forty-nine companies
cut their South African ties in 1986, and fifty-one companies with-
drew in 1987.21 Additional companies are certain to leave as the
TUS REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ANTI-APARTHEID ACT
(GAO/NSIAD-88-44) (Oct. 21, 1987).
19 In July 1986, the Republican-dominated Senate Foreign Relations Committee de-
feated by a party-line vote of 9 to 7 a proposal to mandate the withdrawal of all Ameri-
can investment from South Africa. N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1986, at 1, col. 2.
20 See Wall St. J., July 11, 1986, at 1, col. 6; Smith, South Africa: Time to Stay - or
Go?, FORTUNE, Aug. 4, 1986, at 46.
21 L.A. Times, Jan. 19, 1987, pt. 1, at 1, col. 5 (reporting information provided by the
Investor Responsibility Research Center); L.A. Times, Dec. 24, 1987, pt. 1, at 1, col. 5
(reporting updated information); see also Christian Sci. Monitor, April 20, 1987, at 1,
col. 2 (reporting that nearly 100 companies have withdrawn from South Africa since
1985). In late October 1986, General Motors Corporation and International Business
Machines, two of the largest American businesses in South Africa, announced plans to
sell their interests there. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1986, at 1, col. 3; id. Oct. 22, 1986, at
1, col. 4. These two pullouts fueled speculation about an imminent exodus of United
States corporations from South Africa. A number of other significant companies have
since announced plans to withdraw, including Eastman Kodak Company, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 20, 1986, at DI, col. 6; Revlon and Honeywell, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1986, at DI,
col. 6; Dow Chemical Company, L.A. Times, Feb. 14, 1987, pt. 1, at 3, col. 3; McGraw-
Hill, Inc., L.A. Times, Feb. 27, 1987, pt. 1, at 9, col. 4 (announcing the company would
stop selling its products in the country); Xerox Corporation, N.Y. Times, Mar. 24,
1987, at DI, col. 1; Ford Motor Company, N.Y. Times, June 15, 1987, at 1, col. 3;
Citicorp, Wall St. J., June 17, 1987, at 2, col. 3; and International Business Machines,
Wall St. J., Aug. 24, 1987, at 1, col. 6. In August 1987, the last remaining foreign bank
in South Africa withdrew. AMERICAN BANKER, Aug. 10, 1987, at 3. As of January 1,
1988, U.S. companies doing business in South Africa will no longer be able to deduct
taxes paid to the South African government from their U.S. tax bill. This significant
increase in the cost of doing business is likely to accelerate the withdrawal of U.S. com-
panies from South Africa. Wash. Post, Dec. 24, 1987, at C7, col. 1; L.A. Times, Dec.
24, 1987, pt. 1, at 1, col. 5.
Assessments of the impact and desirability of the corporate withdrawal are varied.
See, e.g., Wall St. J., Dec. 23, 1986, at 1, col. 1 (reporting on anger and bitterness of
South African blacks over corporate withdrawal); Christian Sci. Monitor, Apr. 20,
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South African government becomes more repressive and the situa-
tion there worsens.
Those companies which have sold their operations in South Af-
rica, however, typically continue to sell their products to the in-
dependent, locally owned operations they leave behind.22 It is
probable that those who have urged divestment of stock in compa-
nies with operations in South Africa will now urge divestment of
stock in companies that sell goods in South Africa, even if those
companies have no affiliates or subsidiaries there.23 Thus, corporate
1987, at 1, col. 2 ("the divestment push has at least so far missed its mark"); L.A.
Times, Mar. 13, 1988, pt. 4, at 1, col. 6 (reporting on contention of South African
businessmen, economists, and government officials that sanctions have failed and that,
as a result, South Africa need not fear further sanctions); N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1987, at 1,
col. 5 (report of Reagan Administration to Congress states that economic sanctions
failed to achieve any desired changes in South Africa); Bandow, Break Relations with
South Africa, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1987, at A27, col. 2 (commentator opines that sanc-
tions have been "at best, ineffective"; blacks in South Africa have felt sanctions' greatest
impact; urges termination of sanctions but breaking diplomatic relations with govern-
ment of South Africa); Wash. Post Nat'l Weekly Ed., Dec. 22, 1986, at 18, col. 1 (com-
mentary on "vanishing" social programs in South Africa as U.S. firms withdraw); J.
Silbur, South Africa: The Failure of Sanctions, Address to World Affairs Council of
Maine, Portland, Me. (Mar. 16, 1987). A BBC radio broadcast from South Africa re-
ported that "there have been few visible signs of sanctions having an impact." Sum-
mary of World Broadcasts, Brit. Broadcasting Co., Jan. 20, 1987 (Nexis).
22 See BARRON'S, Oct. 27, 1986, at 18; TIME, Nov. 3, 1986, at 32, col. 1; N.Y. Times,
July 27, 1987, at 21, col. 3; Wall St. J., Oct. 24, 1986, at 2, col. 2. By one account, more
than 35% of the 106 U.S. subsidiaries sold in 1986 and early 1987 continue to sell their
goods in South Africa through licensing, distribution, franchising, or trademark agree-
ments. TIME, June 29, 1987, at 44 (citing Mitchell Investment Management figures).
An exception is Eastman Kodak Company, which announced that it would not only
withdraw from South Africa, but it would also stop all shipments of its products to that
country. N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1986, at Dl, col. 6.
2 3 See TIME, Nov. 3, 1986, at 32, col. 1; Wall St. J., Oct. 24, 1986, at 2, col. 2 (report-
ing on continued public criticism of IBM and General Motors after each company an-
nounced plans to shed its South African subsidiary because no plans were announced to
stop selling goods to the unit). In fact, many divestment mandates arguably proscribe
investment in any company with any sort of business tie in South Africa. Very few
companies that have left South Africa have cut off all business ties, and therefore only a
few companies could meet such a test. See BARRON'S, Oct. 27, 1986, at 18; N.Y. Times,
Feb. 9, 1987, at Dl, col. 6 (reporting on growing pressure on U.S. firms to sever all
business ties with South Africa, not just sell their subsidiaries to local operators); Wash.
Post, Mar. 20, 1987, at A26, col. 1 (reporting that sales of Eastman Kodak products in
South Africa were uninterrupted after the company announced in November that it was
pulling out of South Africa).
This has caused a number of anti-apartheid groups in the United States to promulgate
new guidelines for determining whether companies have "ceased operating" in South
Africa. The new definition of doing business in South Africa includes holding franchis-
ing, licensing, management, or credit agreements with entities in South Africa, or hav-
ing more than 5% of its stock controlled by a South African company. See L.A. Times,
Jan. 19, 1987, pt. 1, at 1, col. 5.
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"withdrawal" alone is unlikely to mollify advocates of divestment,
and opposition to corporate policies is likely to continue. The de-
bate in corporate boardrooms will only shift focus; corporate man-
agers will now consider, not whether to withdraw, but whether they
will continue to sell their products in South Africa.
Yet another arena of debate focuses upon investors in companies
that do business in South Africa. Individual stockholders, institu-
tions, and trustees have considered, upon their own initiative or
upon prompting by trust beneficiaries or third parties, whether they
should divest their ownership interests in companies that do busi-
ness in South Africa.24 Divestment is sometimes promoted as a way
to force companies to withdraw from South Africa. The numbers
themselves suggest that the potential force of public opinion that
Americans might assert through divestment is large. As of 1985,
24 Such a consideration resulted in litigation in Oregon. The Oregon Board of Higher
Education issued a directive to the Oregon Investment Council ("OIC"), which is re-
sponsible for managing the Oregon Higher Education Endowment Fund, to divest the
fund's common stock holdings in companies doing business in South Africa. The
Board's resolution expressed the opinion that divesting would not violate the prudent
investor rule. The OIC refused to follow the request. Four University of Oregon stu-
dents who were recipients of Endowment Fund scholarships, the student governments
of the University of Oregon and Portland State University, and various other student
organizations sought a declaratory judgment that the OIC could not ignore the Board's
directive. The OIC moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs lacked
standing, and the motion was denied.
The trial court ultimately held that the OIC must follow the Board's resolutions.
Moreover, the Board's divestment resolution could not be enforced because it violated
the Oregon "prudent investor" statute. OR. REV. STAT. § 128.057 (1984). Plaintiffs
appealed, and the OIC filed a cross-appeal claiming that the trial court erred in denying
the motion to dismiss the suit for lack of standing. On appeal, the Oregon Court of
Appeals agreed with OIC that the plaintiffs lacked standing. The court declined to
reach the merits of the trial court's prudent investor ruling. Associated Students of
Univ. of Or. v. Oregon Inv. Council, 82 Or. App. 145, 728 P.2d 30 (1986), rev. denied,
303 Or. 74, 734 P.2d 354 (1987).
Two other cases have considered the validity of mandated divestment, but neither
case reached the prudent investor issue. In Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. State, 166
Mich. App. 314, 419 N.W.2d 773 (1988), the Michigan Court of Appeals held unconsti-
tutional a state statute which mandated divestment by educational institutions, includ-
ing public universities, under the logic that the state legislature lacked authority under
the Michigan Constitution to regulate the investments of state universities. In Board of
Trustees of the Employees' Retirement Sys. of Baltimore v. Mayor of Baltimore, Case
No. 86365056/CE-59858 (July 17, 1987), a Maryland trial court upheld the validity of a
Baltimore ordinance requiring its public employee retirement funds to divest from com-
panies doing business in South Africa. The trustees challenged the ordinance on the
ground that it unreasonably burdened the interstate sale of securities, interfered with
the federal government's power to conduct foreign policy, was preempted by the federal
anti-apartheid statute, and impaired contractual pension rights. The trial court rejected
all of these contentions. An appeal is expected. See 14 Pens. Rep. News (BNA) 972
(July 27, 1987); Nat'l Law J., Aug. 3, 1987, at 8, col. 1.
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university endowment funds, public employee pension funds, and
corporate and union pension funds held approximately seventy-two
percent of all publicly held United States stock.2 5 Alternatively,
those who doubt that divestment will influence corporate policy
sometimes advocate divestment as the only proper ethical response
to apartheid.26 Still others, who doubt both the efficacy of divest-
ment and reject the proposition that total divestment is morally
compelled, urge selective divestment as a last resort. Under this
view, it is conceded that divestment is appropriate alfter eff... o to
influence corporate management through shareholder voting cam-
paigns and other means are exhausted and it is clear that a particu-
lar corporation's management will not participate in the struggle
against apartheid." In sum, the question of how American inves-
tors should respond to the tragedy of apartheid is highly
controversial.28
In the short run, the question of how best to respond to apartheid
in South Africa will remain controversial. In the long run, most
observers agree that apartheid will fall, and this will end once and
for all the debate over South African divestment. 29 However, the
larger question of the extent to which trustee-investors are con-
strained by law from following social investing strategies will not be
mooted by termination of the South Africa divestment debate. Is-
sues other than apartheid, such as the employment of nonunion la-
bor, defense contracting, and the sale of alcohol and tobacco
products, have prompted interest in social investing in the past.
25 Smith, American Stocks Shrug OffAnti-Apartheid Pressure, Wall St. J., Apr. 30,
1985, at 34, col. 1.
26 See, e.g., President Spells Out Policy Concerning South Africa, Princeton Weekly
Bull., May 13, 1985, at 3 (remarks of Princeton University President William G.
Bowen); Lewis, What Can We Do? (2), N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1985, at A31, col. 1.
27 See President Bok's Statement on Investment Policy, Harv. Gazette, Oct. 5, 1984, at
8.
28 For example, during July 1986, the University of California Board of Regents
voted to sell $3.1 billion worth of holdings in companies that do business in South
Africa. At the same time, the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association and College
Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF) urged the 160 United States corporations in
which they have investments to pull out of South Africa. Chron. of Higher Educ., July
30, 1986, at 1, col. 2. For a survey of various approaches to divestment, see Gosiger,
Strategies for Divestment from United States Companies and Financial Institutions Doing
Business With or In South Africa, 8 HUMAN RIGHTS Q. 517 (1986).
29 Also, if a complete rupture of economic and diplomatic relations with the minor-
ity-controlled government of South Africa were to occur, the current divestment debate
would be mooted. Such a development, though not beyond imagination, is probably not
likely to occur in the foreseeable future.
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Similar issues will probably arise in the future.3" Therefore, when,
for whatever reason, trustee-investors are urged to implement a
strategy of social investing, they must consider the legal implica-
tions of their actions.3
II
EXISTING LEGAL LIMITATIONS ON INVESTOR
DISCRETION
When creating a trust, the trustor has the discretion to impose
duties on and grant authority to the trustee. If these duties and
powers do not violate a rule of statutory law or public policy, the
30 Indeed, it is possible that the South Africa divestment movement, simply because
of the attention it has focused on social investing, will cause interest groups to advocate
social investing more often in the future. See L.A. Times, May 13, 1987, pt. 1, at 3, col.
4 (reporting on proposed California legislation that would halt state pension fund in-
vestments in U.S. companies that do not agree to abide by a set of anti-discrimination
principles in Northern Ireland).
31 If a trustee breaches a duty owed to the trust beneficiary, the trustee is personally
liable for resulting losses. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 201 (1959) (a
breach of trust is a violation by the trustee of any duty which the trustee owes the
beneficiary); id. § 205 (trustee liable for any loss or depreciation in value of the trust
estate resulting from breach of trust). The University of California Board of Regents
requested the California legislature to absolve them of liability for breach of their fiduci-
ary obligations should divestment cause financial losses. Chron. of Higher Educ., supra
note 28, at 22, col. 3. Obviously, potential liability is of considerable concern to trust-
ees.
With respect to a private trust, however, remedies exist only in favor of a beneficiary.
The beneficiary, or one suing on the beneficiary's behalf, is the only person with stand-
ing to enforce a trust. See 3 A. ScoTr, supra note 5, § 200.
Charitable trusts lack individual beneficiaries. As a result, standing to enforce such
trusts usually resides in the state attorney general. Such a suit can be brought on the
attorney general's own initiative or upon the initiative of a third person. 4 A. SCOTT,
THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 391, at 3003 (3d ed. 1967). If there are cotrustees, one of them
can bring an action against the others to enforce the trust. See id. at 3006; see also Holt
v. College of Osteopathic Physicians and Surgeons, 61 Cal. 2d 750, 394 P.2d 932, 40
Cal. Rptr. 244 (1964). Also, a person who is entitled to receive a "special benefit" under
the trust may be allowed to enforce the trust. 4 A. SCOTT, supra, § 391, at 3007. How-
ever, in the absence of such a relationship, a person cannot maintain the suit in the
individual's own capacity. See id. at 3010. Standing is a potentially difficult hurdle for
one seeking to challenge a social investment strategy. See, e.g., Associated Students of
Univ. of Or. v. Oregon Inv. Council, 82 Or. App. 145, 728 P.2d 30 (1986), rev. denied,
303 Or. 74, 734 P.2d 354 (1987).
Of course, if state law were amended to authorize social investing with regard to a
specific issue or as a general matter, a social investing strategy may not offend tradi-
tional common law duties. However, with respect to pensions governed by ERISA, the
federal law preempts state laws. Thus, it is unlikely a state statute could authorize an
investing strategy that offends ERISA's minimum requirements. See infra text accom-
panying notes 76-91. For a discussion of the likelihood of litigation under ERISA chal-
lenging social investing, see Hutchinson & Cole, supra note 5, at 1380-84.
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trustor's choices will not be disturbed. In the absence of an express
provision in a trust document on a particular point, the rules of
trust law supplement the provisions of the trust document. 32 Thus,
the common law is an important source of limitations on the discre-
tion of trustees. In addition, statutes in many states and some fed-
eral laws impose additional or different duties on trustees.
A. Common Law
The fundamental duty owed by the trustee to the beneficiary is to
administer the trust.3  In managing the trust, "the trustee is re-
quired to manifest the care, skill, prudence, and diligence of an or-
dinarily prudent man engaged in similar business affairs and with
objectives similar to those of the trust in question."' 34 Ordinarily,
the trustee's obligation is to make the trust assets productive, 35 and
the trustee is expected to exercise his investment authority in a
manner consistent with his general management obligations.3 6 As
explained by the Restatement, the duty owned to the beneficiary is,
absent specific provisions in the terms of the trust or a statute, "to
make such investments and only such investments as a prudent man
would make of his own property having in view the preservation of
the estate and the amount and regularity of the income to be
derived." 37
3 2 See 1 A. ScoTr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 4, at 46-47 (3d ed. 1967).
33 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 169 (1959).
3 4 G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 541, at 157 (2d rev. ed. 1978);
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (1959).
35 See G. BOGERT, supra note 34, § 611, at 3.3 6 See id. § 612, at 12. Section 174 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
(1959) provides that "if the trustee has or procures his appointment as trustee by repre-
senting that he has greater skill than that of a man of ordinary prudence, he is under a
duty to exercise such skill." The prudent investor rule actually constituted a liberaliza-
tion of the extremely conservative limitations on trustee investment discretion prevalent
in the eighteenth century. For a discussion of the development of the law governing
trustees' investment authority, see Langbein & Posner, Market Funds and Trust-Invest-
ment Law, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1, 3-6.
37 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227(a) (1959). The prudent investor rule's
generality necessarily means that the rule subsumes other principles. For example, it is
sometimes said that a trustee has a duty to diversify. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Nielsen, 678
F.2d 709, 712 (7th Cir. 1982); In re Estate of Collins, 72 Cal. App. 3d 663, 669, 139 Cal.
Rptr. 644, 648 (1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 228 (1959). This simply
means that a prudent person ordinarily would diversify in order to reduce the risk of
diminution of the trust's assets. If, however, a prudent person would not have diversi-
fied under the circumstances, the trustee has violated none of its duties. See Green v.
Lombard, 28 Md. App. 1, 8, 343 A.2d 905, 911 (1975). Similarly, it is said that the
trustee has a duty to use reasonable care and skill to preserve trust property. See, e.g.,
Nedd v. United Mine Workers, 506 F. Supp. 891, 900 (M.D. Pa. 1980); In re Estate of
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The Restatement formulation of the trustee's investment obliga-
tions indicates that the duty of prudent investing actually has two
components: producing income and preserving the trust corpus.
These twin goals were recognized in an 1830 Massachusetts case,
Harvard College v. Amory,38 which is widely credited with devising
the prudent investor rule:
All that can be required of a trustee to invest, is, that he shall
conduct himself faithfully and exercise a sound discretion. He is
to observe how men of prudence, discretion and intelligence
manage their own affairs, not in regard to speculation, but in re-
gard to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering the
probable income, as well as the probable safety of the capital to
be invested.39
Producing income requires that the trustee evaluate possible and
comparative rates of returns; preserving the estate requires that the
trustee evaluate the risk of possible investments.
The prudent investor rule establishes two separate standards
which measure the trustee's exercise of discretion in pursuit of the
goals of income maximization and corpus preservation. The first is
a requirement that the trustee act with due care. The trustee must
make an "investigation as to the safety of the investment and the
probable income to be derived therefrom."'  This investigation
must examine such matters as would a prudent person; the trustee
is to exercise judgment in considering any advice upon which a pru-
dent person would rely. The second requirement is one of skill.
The trustee must exercise at least the skill of a person of ordinary
intelligence. If the trustee has greater skill or represents that he has
greater expertise, the trustee must exercise that enhanced degree of
skill.41
The basic difficulty confronting the trustee is that the dual objec-
tives of maximizing return and minimizing risk are to some extent
incompatible. The higher the risk, the greater the rate of return; in
Hamill, 7 Pa. 592, 599, 410 A.2d 770, 773 (1980); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 176 (1959). This duty, although sometimes given the status of a separate duty, is
merely another aspect of prudence; a prudent fiduciary would not squander the trust's
assets. See generally B. LONGSTRETH, MODERN INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT AND
THE PRUDENT MAN RULE (1986).
38 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 (1830).
39 Id. at 461. Nothing, of course, prevents a state legislature from altering the pru-
dent investor rule through statutory enactment. For one such alteration which draws
heavily on the prudence standard of ERISA, see CAL. CIV. CODE § 2261 (West 1985).
40 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227 comment b (1959).
41 See id. comment c.
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other words, investors receive higher rates of return in exchange for
accepting the higher risk that an invested asset will decline in value.
If the trustee were to give unreasonably disproportionate weight to
the goal of income maximization, the trustee would run an unac-
ceptable risk of diminishing the trust's corpus. Yet, if the trustee
were to give excessive favor to guaranteed investments in order to
maximize safety, the trustee would be vulnerable to the charge that
he failed to pursue with sufficient vigor the objective of maximizing
income. The proper baiance of return and risk depends on many
circumstances. 42  Nevertheless, it is widely understood, despite
some opinions to the contrary,43 that achieving the maximum rate
of return and avoiding undue risk are the sole and exclusive objec-
tives of the trustee.44
42 Which objective is primary depends on the circumstances:
In some circumstances the amount and regularity of the income may be more
important than the preservation of the principal; under other circumstances
the preservation of the principal may be of primary importance. It is impossi-
ble to lay down a hard-and-fast rule as to what is a prudent investment, since
much may depend upon the time and place of the administration of the trust,
and much may depend upon the character of the particular trust.
Id. comment e.
43 Professor Scott opined:
Trustees in deciding whether to invest in, or to retain, the securities of a cor-
poration may properly consider the social performance of the corporation.
They may decline to invest in, or to retain, the securities of corporations
whose activities or some of them are contrary to fundamental and generally
accepted ethical principles. They may consider such matters as pollution, race
discrimination, fair employment and consumer responsibility.... Of course
they may well believe that a corporation which has a proper sense of social
obligation is more likely to be successful in the long run than those which are
bent on obtaining the maximum amount of profits. But even if this were not
so, the investor, though a trustee of funds for others, is entitled to consider the
welfare of the community, and refrain from allowing the use of the funds in a
manner detrimental to society.
3 A. ScoTr, supra note 5, § 227.17 (footnote omitted). Professor Scott offered little
support for his conclusion. Moreover, the authority that does exist, as sparse as it is,
points the other direction, as the discussion in the text indicates. Ravikoff and Curzan,
supra note 5, at 522-24, also argue that some existing case law on the prudent investor
standard permits social investing, even when the objectives of maximizing return and
corpus safety are sacrificed.
44 Langbein & Posner, supra note 5, at 98 ("[t]he duty of prudent investing ... rein-
forces the duty of loyalty in forbidding the trustee to invest for any object other than the
highest return consistent with the preferred level of portfolio risk"); see also Ravikoff &
Curzan, supra note 5, at 518 (courts have traditionally evaluated the prudence of an
investment exclusively in terms of these two objectives); 38 Op. Or. Att'y Gen. 2017,
2031 (1978) (interpreting Oregon statute codifying prudent investor rule as limiting
trustee to consideration of "safety of the investment and probable return [such that
other] considerations, such as political or moral judgments, are not relevant and should
not deflect investment managers from their legal duty") (footnote omitted); Op. Fla.
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If maximizing income and preserving the corpus are the only
objectives a trustee can pursue, it would appear that invoking social
criteria in choosing among alternative investments is impermissible.
Yet if the trustee is faced with two alternative investments of equal
risk and return, the prudent investor rule gives the trustee no in-
struction on how to choose between the investment opportunities.
In such a case, it would seem that-all else being equal-opting for
one investment over the other based on a social preference would
not offend the prudent investor rule.45 Unfortunately, no reported
case has decided or even explored the question of whether a trustee
can pursue a social investing strategy without violating the prudent
investor rule.
Two cases, however, have considered the question of whether a
trustee can, consistent with the duty of care, manage trust assets to
achieve purposes unrelated to the maximization of income and the
preservation of the trust corpus. These cases have figured promi-
nently in commentaries on social investing. Blankenship v. Boyle4 6
involved a fund established by numerous employers to provide pen-
sion, medical, hospital, work-related illness and disability, and other
benefits for coal miners, most of whom belonged to the United Mine
Workers Union. The fund's trustees bought large blocks of stock of
certain electric utilities in an effort to induce the utilities' manage-
ments to burn union-mined coal.4 7 Some of the beneficiaries of the
fund sued the trustees. The federal district court eventually en-
joined the trustees "from operating the Fund in a manner designed
Att'y Gen., No. 85-30 (Apr. 17, 1985) (Westlaw) (no statute authorizes the State Board
of Administration to adopt a divestment rule based on ethical ideals or standards; the
only permissible investment criteria are yield, risk, and diversification; if the location of
an investment in an unstable part of the world makes the investment risky, divesting the
asset based on that criterion is within the discretionary authority of the Board).
To achieve these twin objectives of maximizing return and minimizing risk, the Re-
statement's drafters identified ten criteria that the trustee should consider in selecting a
given investment. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227 comment o (1959). "So-
cial values" does not appear on the list. An Oregon trial court held that South Africa
divestment violates the prudent investor rule, although this conclusion was vacated on
appeal without a ruling on the merits. Associated Students of Univ. of Or. v. Oregon
Inv. Council, 82 Or. App. 145, 728 P.2d 30 (1986), rev. denied, 303 Or. 74, 734 P.2d 354
(1987); see supra note 24. Overall, reported court decisions evaluating the prudence of
novel investment strategies are very sparse. See B. LONGSTRETH, supra note 37, at 16-
22.
4 5 But see 38 Op. Or. Att'y Gen. 2017, 2018 (1978) ("It is inappropriate and irrele-
vant for the investment managers to consider any factors other than the probable safety
of, and the probable income from, the investments as required by the statute.").
46329 F. Supp. 1089 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd mem., 511 F.2d 447 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
47 Id. at 1105-06.
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in whole or in part to afford collateral advantages to the Union or
the [employers].""
The court's holding in Blankenship, if taken literally, constitutes
a very narrow construction of a trustee's discretion: it is not lawful
for a trustee to take factors unrelated to risk and return into ac-
count when choosing among alternative investments.49 Managing a
fund to secure collateral advantages or promote collateral objectives
is impermissible, even if the paramount objectives of maximizing
return and minimizing risk are not compromised.
It is highly doubtful the court meant for its holding to reach so
far, however. Instead, the court probably meant to hold only that
the trustees could not sacrifice return or corpus safety to secure col-
lateral advantages. In describing the breach of trust, the court
noted that "these particular challenged stock purchases were made
primarily for the collateral benefits they gave the Union."5 It was
almost certainly the sacrifice of the pension fund's profitability,
caused by the decline in value of the utility stock,5 that concerned
the plaintiffs, not the fact that the unions were benefiting from the
investment strategy. If it were clear that the fund's risk and return
were not adversely affected by the trustees' investment strategy, it is
doubtful the plaintiffs would have asserted a claim. If in such a
situation a claim were asserted, it would have made little sense to
hold that the trustees could not choose to favor the stock of compa-
nies purchasing union-manufactured products over that of compa-
nies employing nonunion labor, all else being equal.
In the second case, Withers v. Teachers' Retirement System, 52 a
federal district court upheld the decision of a fund's trustees to
purchase New York City bonds as part of the plan that ultimately
prevented that city's bankruptcy in late 1975. The pension fund in
question was not fully funded; its main asset was New York City's
contractual liability to pay benefits out of future tax revenues. The
trustees were nearly certain the city's payments to the fund would
48 Id. at 1113. The court also enjoined the trustees from engaging in practices it
regarded as breaches of trust. Id.
49 See Ravikoff & Curzan, supra note 5, at 522.
50 329 F. Supp. at 1106 (emphasis added). The court in Withers v. Teachers' Retire-
ment Sys., 447 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd mem., 595 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir.
1979), similarly read Blankenship as "a case in which the trustees pursued policies
which may incidentally have aided the beneficiaries of the fund but which were in-
tended, primarily to enhance the position of the Union and the welfare of its members."
447 F. Supp. at 1256.
51 See 329 F. Supp. at 1105.
I 52 447 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd mem., 595 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1979).
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cease if the city entered bankruptcy. Therefore, the trustees joined
with four other municipal-employee pension funds to purchase $2.5
billion in city obligations over a thirty-month period in order to
help the city avoid bankruptcy.
The fund beneficiaries, retirees of the New York City school-
teachers' pension fund, claimed that the trustees acted more for the
benefit of the city than in the interest of the beneficiaries themselves.
Indeed, the bonds had an extremely high risk of default, the
purchase was of an excessive amount, and the purchase left the pen-
sion fund underdiversified. The court, however, rejected the retir-
ees' claim, concluding that
[N]either the protection of the jobs of the City's teachers nor the
general public welfare were factors which motivated the trustees
in their investment decision. The extension of aid to the City was
simply a means-the only means, in their assessment-to the le-
gitimate end of preventing the exhaustion of the assets of the
[pension fund] in the interest of all the beneficiaries.53
At first glance, Withers and Blankenship seem inconsistent be-
cause, as Ravikoff and Curzan argued, "There is little distinction
between saving a city that guarantees a pension fund and protecting
union jobs that serve to bolster an existing pension fund."' 54 Yet,
Withers is distinguishable because the fund trustees perceived the
bond purchase as essential to the preservation of the trust corpus,
while in Blankenship, the fund had a "predictable steady income in
the form of monthly royalty payments. ' 55 Had the trustees in
Withers failed even to consider such a purchase, it is conceivable the
trustees could have been in breach of their duty to use reasonable
care and skill to preserve trust property. 6
In short, Blankenship does not, by itself, present an imposing case
against a trustee's decision to pursue a social investing strategy, at
least where social investing does not impair return or increase risk.
53 447 F. Supp. at 1256. The trustees in Withers also made their commitment to
purchase city bonds conditional on the enactment of federal legislation providing for the
financing needs of New York City, the enactment of state legislation clarifying the legal
status of the pension funds and the responsibilities of the trustees, a commitment from
the New York Governor to introduce legislation the trustees believed would strengthen
the funding of the pension plans, and a ruling from the Internal Revenue Service (or,
alternatively, the enactment of a federal statute) providing that the purchases of city
obligations would not jeopardize the fund's tax-exempt status under the exclusive-bene-
fit rule. See 447 F. Supp. at 1253.
54 Ravikoff & Curzan, supra note 5, at 523.
55 329 F. Supp. at 1096.
56 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 176 (1959); Ravikoff & Curzan, supra
note 5, at 528 ("the trustee must, at a minimum, preserve the trust corpus").
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At the same time, it cannot be said that Withers significantly under-
cuts the traditional view that the trustee must uncompromisingly
pursue the dual goals of maximizing return and minimizing risk.
Thus, until clearer authority exists concerning a trustee's discretion
to practice social investing, the trustee who chooses to base invest-
ment decisions on social, moral, or political factors assumes the
risks: first, that a disgruntled beneficiary will later claim that the
trustee breached the duty of prudent investing; and, second, that a
court, lacking the benefit of clear precedents or legislative guidance,
will agree with the beneficiary's argument.5 7
One other potentially relevant duty owed by a trustee to the bene-
ficiary is the duty of loyalty.5" According to the Restatement, it is
the trustee's fiduciary obligation to manage trust property "for the
benefit of" the trust's beneficiary.59 Moreover, "[t]he trustee is
under a duty to the beneficiary to administer the trust solely in the
interest of the beneficiary."'  In most situations where the duty is
claimed to have been violated, the trustee has allegedly adminis-
tered the trust for his own financial benefit.61 Occasionally, it is
argued the trustee administered the trust for the financial benefit of
a third party, to the beneficiary's detriment.62 Because social in-
vesting involves the promotion of social, moral, or political values,
and not the bestowal of a pecuniary benefit on the trustee or some
third party, the duty of loyalty, as it has developed in the cases,
arguably has no relevance whatsoever to the permissibility of social
investing. Nevertheless, the underlying principle in the duty of loy-
alty cases appears to be that the trustee must be guided, not by the
57 Fear of these risks has affected the behavior of some trustee-investors. Concern
over potential liability apparently prompted the Baltimore lawsuit, where trustees for
the city's employee retirement plan sought a declaratory judgment in order, among
other reasons, to insulate themselves from potential liability. See Board of Trustees of
the Employees' Retirement Sys. of Baltimore v. Mayor of Baltimore, Case No.
86365056/CE-59858 (July 17, 1987); supra note 24; Bus. WEEK, July 6, 1987, at 53.
Some trustees have cited their fiduciary obligations in explaining decisions not to divest.
See N.Y. Times, June 8, 1987, at 26, col. 5 (fund managers state that they cannot sup-
port Rev. Sullivan's plea for divestment, as a means to cause corporate withdrawal from
South Africa, because of their legal obligation to manage funds prudently).
58 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 169-185 (1959) (includes duty to ad-
minister trust; duty not to delegate the trustee's responsibilities; duty to keep and render
accounts).
59 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (1959).6 0 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) (emphasis added).
61 See generally 2 A. Scorr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 170.17 (3d ed. 1967).
6 2 See, e.g., Ahuna v. Department of Hawaiian Home Lands, 64 Haw. 327, 640 P.2d
1161 (1982); In re Saeger's Estate, 340 Pa. 73, 16 A.2d 19 (1940). Withers and Blanken-
ship also fall into this category.
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desires of third parties, but by the interests of the beneficiary.63
Plainly, the wishes of third parties regarding trust administration
ought not take precedence over the beneficiary's interest. Yet, it is
far from clear that the duty of loyalty prevents a trustee from con-
sidering collateral factors in circumstances where there is no possi-
bility the beneficiary's interests will be compromised. Blankenship
can be read to mean that a trustee cannot loyally serve the benefi-
ciaries of a trust while simultaneously promoting objectives collat-
eral to maximization of return and minimization of risk. However,
it is unlikely the court meant that taking any factor other than re-
turn or risk into account in investment decision-making automati-
cally constitutes disloyalty to the beneficiary. On the other hand,
Withers does not directly support a trustee giving deference to
objectives unrelated to return and risk, since the trustees' efforts in
Withers to promote the solvency of the city appeared consistent
with the beneficiaries' interests.
In the final analysis, we found no cases that definitively decide
whether a trustee's promotion of goals collateral to return and risk
objectives, in circumstances not involving pecuniary remuneration
to third parties or the trustee personally, automatically constitutes
disloyalty to the beneficiary. As long as this uncertainty persists,
the trustee who pursues social values as part of an investment strat-
egy runs the risk of subsequently being held to have violated the
duty of loyalty.
In short, the duty of prudent investing, as currently understood,
appears to prohibit an investment strategy that compromises the
objectives of maximizing the rate of return and preserving the safety
of the trust corpus in order to further other interests, such as social
or political goals. If, however, it can be demonstrated that social
investing does not compromise either of the dual aims of the pru-
dent investor rule, social investing should not be proscribed under
the authority of that rule. In addition, the trustee's duty of loyalty
to the beneficiary is arguably violated in circumstances where the
trustee seeks to promote social or political values through invest-
ment policies. If, however, social investing does not impair the in-
terests of trust beneficiaries by either reducing the rate of return or
increasing the risk of loss of the trust's corpus, no justification exists
for interpreting the duty of loyalty as absolutely proscribing a
trustee from taking political and social values into account in in-
vestment decision making.





The Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act
(UMIFA)64 has been adopted in twenty-eight states and the District
of Columbia.65 The Act's purpose is to clarify for governing boards
of eleemosynary institutions, particularly colleges and universities,66
the legal limitations on their authority to invest the funds they man-
age. The UMIFA not only specifies the investment authority of
covered institutions but also specifies standards for the exercise of
investment discretion.
Section 6 of the UMIFA states a "business care and prudence"
standard of conduct for investors:
In the administration of the powers to appropriate appreciation,
to make and retain investments, and to delegate investment man-
agement of institutional funds, members of a governing board
shall exercise ordinary business care and prudence under the
facts and circumstances prevailing at the time of the action or
decision. In so doing they shall consider long and short term
needs of the institution in carrying out its educational, religious,
charitable, or other eleemosynary purposes, its present and antic-
ipated financial requirements, expected total return on its invest-
ments, price level trends, and general economic conditions.67
The purpose of inserting the business care and prudence standard
into section 6 was to free governing boards to some extent from the
constraining effects of the common law obligations imposed on pri-
vate trustees. The comment to section 6 states that the UMIFA's
standard of care "is generally comparable to that of a director of a
business corporation rather than that of a private trustee. ' 68 Cases
in the corporate area recognize that some charitable contributions
by corporations are justifiable on the ground the corporation fur-
thers its own long-term interests by providing benefits to society as
a whole. 69 To this extent, the Act countenances some social invest-
6 4 UNIF. MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT [hereinafter UMIFA], 7A U.L.A.
705 (1985). This statute was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws in 1972.
65 UMIFA, 7A U.L.A. 143 (Supp. 1988).
66 The statute applies to organizations, whether incorporated or unincorporated, op-
erated exclusively for educational, religious, charitable, or other eleemosynary purposes.
UMIFA § 1(1), 7A U.L.A. 712 (1985).
67 UMIFA § 6, 7A U.L.A. 721 (1985).
68 UMIFA § 6 comment, 7A U.L.A. 721 (1985).
69 See Ravikoff & Curzan, supra note 5, at 537-38.
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ing, but it does not redirect a governing board's obligation to serve
the interests of the institution.
Perhaps the most important effect of section 6 is its easing of the
standard for the fiduciary's liability. Many courts have recognized
that the standard of care imposed upon a trustee is more strict than
that imposed upon a corporate director.7° One court explained the
difference as follows:
Both trustees and corporate directors are liable for losses occa-
sioned by their negligent mismanagement of investments. How-
ever, the degree of care required appears to differ in manyjurisdictions. A trustee is uniformly held to a high standard of
care and will be held liable for simple negligence, while a director
must often have committed "gross negligence" or otherwise be
guilty of more than mere mistakes of judgment.7 '
This means, in effect, that corporate directors have much greater
freedom to exercise their discretion than do private trustees.72 Be-
cause the UMIFA imports the more lenient standard applicable to
corporate directors to the managers of eleemosynary institutions,
the UMIFA should reduce the extent to which their investment de-
cisions are subject to judicial second-guessing. Accordingly, the de-
cision of the governing board of an eleemosynary institution to
engage in a strategy of social investing is more likely to pass muster
than the same decision of a private trustee, at least as long as the
board's decision is arguably in the institution's interest.
The tempering effect of the UMIFA on a trustee's fiduciary obli-
gation is underscored by section 4 of the Act. Section 4 provides
that a fiduciary may "invest and reinvest an institutional fund in
any real or personal property deemed advisable by the governing
board, whether or not it produces a current return .... ,,73 This
70 See, e.g., Selheimer v. Manganese Corp. of Am., 423 Pa. 563, 224 A.2d 634, 642
(1966); Litwin v. Allen, - Misc. -, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 678 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940).
71 Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training School for Deaconesses and Missiona-
ries, 381 F. Supp. 1003, 1013 (D.D.C. 1974) (citations omitted); see also Beard v. Ach-
enbach Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 170 F.2d 859, 862 (10th Cir. 1948); Kamin v. American
Express Co., 86 Misc. 2d 809, 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 811, aff'd, 54 A.D. 2d 654, 387
N.Y.S.2d 993 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976); Troyer, Slocombe & Boisture, supra note 5, at
136-38.72 This is an important observation for charitable corporations, as distinct from pri-
vate charitable trusts, in states that have not enacted the UMIFA. The investment
decisions of directors of such corporations are likely to be evaluated under the more
lenient rules applicable to corporate directors generally. See Troyer, Slocombe & Bois-
ture, supra note 5, at 131-32 & n. 11. The more lenient standard of the UMIFA applies
to all charitable organizations, whether or not incorporated.
73 UMIFA § 4(1), 7A U.L.A. 719 (1985).
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provision clarifies the authority of governing boards to hold
donated property, even though it may not be the best investment, in
the hope of obtaining additional contributions.74 Additional contri-
butions are, of course, in the institution's interest, which remains
the overriding objective of the trustee-investor.
Overall, then, the UMIFA gives a governing board of an eleemos-
ynary institution more investment flexibility. However, because the
board's duties of care and loyalty are owed to the institution, the
UMIFA stops considerably sh ort of giving them blankret aulluLLY
to implement social investing strategies.
7 5
2. ERISA
In 1974, Congress passed the Employee Retirement Income Se-
curity Act (ERISA).76 This massive statute, which substantially su-
persedes state laws relating to private employee benefit plans,
imposes rules on the investment of pension fund assets. Rather
than specifically enumerate all powers and duties of trustees and
fiduciaries, Congress "invoked the common law of trusts to define
74 See UMIFA § 4 comment, 7A U.L.A. 719 (1985).
75 See Ravikoff & Curzan, supra note 5, at 539.
To the extent that fiduciaries use institutional funds to undertake limited char-
itable activities, their actions will probably be viewed as prudent. But should
these endeavors grow in scope and reduce not only achievable current return,
but also long-term portfolio growth, fiduciaries will have to justify these activi-
ties as in the self-interest of the institution.
Id. See also B. LONGSTRETH, supra note 37, at 29 (the UMIFA and other develop-
ments of last 15 years "should significantly lessen the discomfort of a charitable corpo-
ration investment manager contemplating investments that would be suspect under the
law governing trustees of private trusts"; but for nonconventional investment products
and techniques not specifically permitted by UMIFA, the dearth of case law is likely to
discourage their use unless they become widely accepted by similar institutions); Op.
Kan. Att'y Gen. No. 85-153 (Nov. 12, 1985) (LEXIS) (fiduciary under UMIFA may
consider "the political and economic situations existing in [South Africa] as they affect
the security of the investment") (emphasis added).
As discussed earlier, supra note 24, an Oregon trial court held that the Oregon Board
of Higher Education's order that the Oregon Investment Council divest the Oregon
Higher Education Endowment Fund's common stock holdings in companies doing
business in South Africa violated the prudent investor rule. Associated Students of
Univ. of Or. v. Oregon Inv. Council, 82 Or. App. 145, 728 P.2d 30 (1986), rev. denied,
303 Or. 74, 734 P.2d 354 (1987). Oregon has enacted the UMIFA, OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 128.310-.355 (1987), but this was not enough in the trial court's view to validate the
Board's divestment decision. The Oregon Court of Appeals disposed of the case on the
ground the plaintiffs lacked standing and declined to reach the merits of the trial court's
prudent investor ruling. Associated Students of Univ. of Or., 82 Or. App. 145, 728 P.2d
30.
76 Employee Retirement Income Security Act [hereinafter ERISA], 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461 (1985).
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the general scope of their authority and responsibility. '77 Specifi-
cally, Congress defined the fiduciaries' responsibility by reference to
the common law's duty of loyalty and standard of care.7 8
Section 404(a) of ERISA provides that a fiduciary shall adminis-
ter a plan "solely in the interest of the participants and benefi-
ciaries ' 79 and "for the exclusive purpose of: (i) providing benefits to
participants and their beneficiaries; and (ii) defraying reasonable ex-
penses of administering the plan."8 This section, though not free
from ambiguity, was probably intended as a restatement of the
traditional interpretation of the common law duty of loyalty; the
trust is established for the benefit of retirees and not to "provide
collateral or speculative 'benefits' to plan participants or appeal to
the philosophical leanings of the plan sponsor or other parties asso-
ciated with the plan."8 1
Section 404(a) also codifies the prudent investor rule. The section
provides that the fiduciary shall administer the plan "with the care,
skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevail-
ing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with
such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like
character and with like aims."8 2 Section 404(a) also imposes a duty
on the fiduciary to diversify the plan's investments unless it is
"clearly prudent" not to do SO.83
In some respects, ERISA departs from the common law duties.
For example, one aspect of ERISA's prudence requirement appears
stricter than the common law rule. Under the common law, a fidu-
ciary must exercise the skill and care that a prudent person would
use in managing his own property. Under ERISA, the fiduciary is
required to exercise a higher degree of skill and care-basically the
skill and care of an expert in trust management matters.
Another aspect of the ERISA prudence requirement seems less
stringent than the common law rule. Under an approach some-
times followed by courts when applying the common law's pru-
dence requirement,- fiduciaries are required to defend the
77 Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transp., Inc., 472 U.S.
559, 570 (1985).
7 8 1d.
79 ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).
80 ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A).
81 Hutchinson & Cole, supra note 5, at 1371; see also Lanoff, supra note 5, at 389.
82 ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B).
83 ERISA § 404(a)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C).
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performance of each investment, 84 despite the fact that examining
each investment on its own merits is nonsensical in light of what is
now known about the financial marketplace and portfolio theory.85
In contrast, ERISA requires that the evaluation of the prudence of
an investment decision relating to a particular asset focus upon the
role the asset plays in the entire portfolio. The ERISA rule ac-
knowledges that the performance of the entire portfolio, the sum
total of its individual components, is paramount, not the perform-
of., ,"rtu,,.l,,, .sset v. A ;S :1,,. 86 1 U... , DTA
..... m, ......... .. a..11. us . UI, JLII, L ISAr1.
rule probably allows fiduciaries to take greater risks with individual
investments than the constrained view of the prudent investor rule,
so long as the entire portfolio is adequately balanced. This means
that ERISA may make it easier for a fund manager to justify a par-
ticular investment decision based on social factors if the entire port-
folio remains in balance.
In one significant respect, ERISA is stricter than the common
law: it abolishes the common law principle of authorization. At
common law, a trustor can authorize the trustee to pursue invest-
ment strategies that would otherwise violate the prudent investor
84 See Withers v. Teachers' Retirement Sys., 447 F. Supp. 1248, 1255 (S.D.N.Y.
1978), aff'd mem., 595 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1979); In re Bank of New York, 35 N.Y.2d
512, 323 N.E.2d 700, 364 N.Y.S.2d 164 (1974); Hutchinson & Cole, supra note 5, at
1355. The tendency of some courts to focus on the performance and risk of individual
investments has retarded the common law's acceptance of modern portfolio theory and
other insights of economists and finance scholars on how markets operate. See B.
LONGSTRETH, supra note 37, at 83-86, 110-16, 154-59; Gordon, The Puzzling Survival
of the Constrained Prudent Man Rule, in B. LONGSTRETH, supra note 37, at 195-231.
85 One of "the principal lessons of modem portfolio theory for fiduciaries" is that,
[b]y holding a well-diversified portfolio, one can remove issuer-specific risks,
leaving only the systemic risk of the particular market for which the securities
in the portfolio are a proxy. The lesson for prudence is that the standard
should be applied to the portfolio as a whole, rather than ... to each security
in the portfolio. The volatility of each individual security is only important in
its impact on the volatility of the whole portfolio and should be so tested in
evaluating the prudence of holding it.
B. LONGSTRETH, supra note 37, at 82 (conclusion drawn from Elton & Gruber, The
Lessons of Modern Portfolio Theory, in B. LONGSTRETH, supra note 37, at 161). See
Langbein & Posner, supra note 5, at 77 ("The portfolio is the relevant security."). See
generally Langbein & Posner, Market Funds and Trust-Investment Law, 1976 AM. BAR
FOUND. REs. J. 1 (1976); Note, The Regulation of Risky Investments, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 603 (1970).
86 If the common law approach to prudence that requires each investment to be ana-
lyzed separately were understood to mean that each investment must be analyzed sepa-
rately in light of its impact on the entire portfolio, the common law approach would be
virtually identical to the ERISA standard, which is consistent with the lessons of mod-
ern portfolio theory. See B. LONGSTRETH, supra note 37, at 84; Gordon, supra note 84,
at 200-02.
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rule. ERISA specifically prohibits "any provision... which pur-
ports to relieve a fiduciary from responsibility or liability."'8 7 There-
fore, "the plan documents cannot authorize a policy of social
investment that would otherwise be impermissible under the fiduci-
ary standards of the Act."8 8 This does not mean that social invest-
ing is per se imprudent. In fact, one former ERISA administrator
has opined that social criteria could be considered in choosing
among investments with otherwise equal financial indicators.8 9
However, it does mean that, unlike the common law, the plan docu-
ments cannot authorize an investment strategy that sacrifices rate of
return or unreasonably increases risk.9°
87 ERISA § 410(a), 29 U.S.C. § l110(a).
88 Hutchison & Cole, supra note 5, at 1372. The legislative history of ERISA con-
firms this interpretation of the Act. Id. at 1372-74. Similarly, an article by the chief
ERISA Administrator stated that both the duty of loyalty and the prudent investor rule
would be violated if a fiduciary were to make an "investment decision based on other
objectives, such as to promote the job security of a class of current or future partici-
pants." Lanoff, supra note 5, at 389.
Ravikoff and Curzan claim that ERISA's statutory requirement that the fiduciary
invest "for the exclusive purpose of ... providing benefits to participants and their
beneficiaries," ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(l)(A) (emphasis added), can
be read broadly. They state: "The concept of 'benefits' . . . need not be limited to
payments that a participant or beneficiary would receive upon retirement, i.e., pure eco-
nomic return to an investment. It is arguably broad enough to include numerous types
of positive returns, e.g., job security and improved working conditions." Ravikoff &
Curzan, supra note 5, at 532. However, this analysis is inconsistent with Hutchinson
and Cole's careful construction of the statute. They suggested
that ERISA trusts are to be established and maintained for the limited pur-
pose of providing retirement benefits and not for other, socially desirable pur-
poses which provide collateral or speculative 'benefits' to plan participants or
appeal to the philosophical leanings of the plan sponsor or other parties asso-
ciated with the plan.
Hutchinson & Cole, supra note 5, at 1371 (noting that "the issue is not free from
doubt").
89 The ERISA Administrator stated in a 1980 article that the Labor Department's
1979 approval of provisions in a Chrysler-UAW collective bargaining agreement author-
izing some social investing of pension fund assets was based on the understanding that
the investments would be "economically competitive with other investment opportuni-
ties which may not contain similar socially beneficial features." Lanoff, supra note 5, at
392. See also Hutchison & Cole, supra note 5, at 1355 ("[S]ocially sensitive investing by
a defined contribution plan may not be imprudent if a thorough analysis of the plan's
portfolio demonstrates that the risk and return associated with the investment comple-
ment the remainder of the plan's portfolio in meeting the plan's investment
objectives.").
90 Certain provisions of the Internal Revenue Code also impose common law duties
on pension plan managers. To qualify for tax-exempt status, an employer's pension
plan must be maintained for "the exclusive benefit of his employees or their benefi-
ciaries," and the plan documents must make it impossible for any part of the pension
fund to be diverted for other purposes. I.R.C. § 401(a)(2) (1982). Because depriving a
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In the final analysis, ERISA gives paramount importance to the
interests of pension fund beneficiaries.91 This is not surprising,
since the statute's fundamental purpose is to protect the retirement
benefits of employees in the private sector. Thus, ERISA gives
overriding-and perhaps exclusive-weight to the criteria of in-
come production and avoiding undue risk in the management of
pension fund assets.
3. ssue-SpecRc State Statiltes
In recent years, public outrage over apartheid has resulted in the
enactment of statutes in at least ten states mandating divestment by
state-owned or state-managed funds in companies doing business in
South Africa.92 These statutes vary in scope and focus, 93 but the
pension plan of tax-exempt status would have terrible consequences for the participants,
the Internal Revenue Service has interpreted the exclusive benefit rule to allow some
collateral benefit to other persons so long as the primary purpose of the fund is to
benefit employees or their beneficiaries. The courts have concurred with this interpreta-
tion. Hutchison & Cole, supra note 5, at 1347-48.
91 See NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 332-34 (1981); White v. Distributors
Ass'n Warehousemen's Pension Trust, 751 F.2d 1068, 1071 n.2 (9th Cir. 1985); Dono-
van v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1069 (1982). In an
advertisement, TIAA-CREF, a major pension plan for university staff and faculty na-
tionwide, reported on the decision of its Board of Trustees to initiate shareholder resolu-
tions demanding that companies doing business in South Africa adhere to the Sullivan
Principles. (For a discussion of the Sullivan Principles, see infra note 108.) The adver-
tisement also explained the reasons for opposing total divestment:
Currently ERISA's fiduciary standards... are widely interpreted as prohibit-
ing the purchase, holding or sale of securities for nonfinancial reasons....
Total divestment, with its risks as to investment performance, and its consid-
erable transaction and brokerage costs, would violate these standards. It is
clear that CREF, its trustees and management are fiduciaries under ERISA.
As such, CREF must act solely in the interest of participants .... Thus,
although the social outlook and policies of a portfolio company are factors to
be considered in evaluating an investment decision, there is no question that
the buy/sell decision ultimately must be based on what is financially best for
the participants.
Chron. of Higher Educ., Dec. 5, 1985, at 24.
9 2 See American Committee on Africa, Public Investment and South Africa (Oct.
1986) (compilation of state and county divestment actions, with amounts affected; re-
ports on statutes requiring divestment in California, Connecticut, Iowa, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Vermont, and the Vir-
gin Islands). One news report indicates that 19 states, 13 counties, and 70 cities now
prohibit investment of public monies in South Africa. N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1987, at 25,
col. 6.
Other anti-apartheid actions at the state and local level also evidence American oppo-
sition to apartheid. While legislation in Louisiana did not order divestment, it did pro-
hibit the deposit of state funds in banks that make loans to the South African
government or its agencies. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:308.2 (West Supp. 1986).
State agencies of one sort or another in several additional states are reported to have
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most common formulation requires divestment of funds invested in
companies failing to conduct their business in South Africa in ac-
cordance with articulated standards.94 These statutes do not au-
made a prodivestment decision of one kind or another. See American Committee on
Africa, supra, at 1-5 (Colorado, Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, North Dakota, West Vir-
ginia, Wisconsin). Moreover, eighty-nine cities and counties are reported to have en-
acted some sort of prodivestment ordinance or resolution. Id. at 6-17.
For the argument that these state statutes and local ordinances are unconstitutional
on federal commerce and foreign affairs grounds and are vulnerable to federal preemp-
tion, see Note, State and Local Anti-South Africa Action as an Intrusion Upon the Fed-
eral Power in Foreign Affairs, 72 VA. L. REv. 813 (1986); Comment, The
Constitutionality of State and Local Governments' Response to Apartheid: Divestment
Legislation, 13 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 763 (1985); G. Smith, Apartheid Act Casts Doubt
on Local Laws, L.A. Times, Mar. 16, 1987, pt. 2, at 5, col. 3 (arguing that the Anti-
Apartheid Act preempts state and local anti-apartheid laws).
9 3 See, e.g., CAL. GoV'T CODE §§ 16640-16650 (West Supp. 1987) (mandating a one-
year ban on investment by the State Teachers Employment Fund and the Public Em-
ployees Retirement Fund in companies making new investments in South Africa, with a
three-year phased divestment plan, to be completed in 1991); MD. STATE FIN. & PROC.
CODE ANN. § 6-208 (1985) (prohibiting the deposit of state funds in banks making
loans to the South African government or national companies); MD. STATE FIN. &
PROC. CODE ANN. § 18-902 (Supp. 1986) (prohibiting, effective January 1, 1987, state
agencies from knowingly purchasing supplies produced or manufactured in South Af-
rica); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 32, § 23(ii) (West Supp. 1986) (prohibiting the state
employee and teachers' retirement funds from investing in any bank or financial institu-
tions making loans to the Republic of South Africa or its instrumentalities, and requir-
ing divestment of stocks in companies doing business in or with South Africa); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2402(l)(f) (West 1985) (requiring Michigan educational insti-
tutions to divest any investments held in companies operating in South Africa. This
statute has been declared unconstitutional; see supra note 24); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 21.145(5) (West 1981) (prohibiting the deposit of state funds in financial institu-
tions making loans to the government of South Africa, a national corporation of South
Africa, or an American corporation operating in South Africa); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 52:18A-89.1-89.2 (West 1986) (prohibiting any state pension or annuity fund from
investing in any bank or financial institution loaning money to the South African gov-
ernment or its instrumentalities and from investing in stocks of companies engaged in
business in or with the Republic of South Africa, and requiring divestment within three
years); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:20-1(f) (West Supp. 1986) (prohibiting domestic insur-
ers from investing in obligations issued by the African Development Bank that go to or
are to be used in South Africa). Some of the statutes address issues other than doing
business in South Africa. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 3-13(g) (West Supp.
1986) (requiring review of the state's investment policies regarding corporations en-
gaged in business in Iran); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 32, § 23(iii) (West Supp. 1986)
(imposing restrictions on investment in stocks held in companies that manufacture
munitions used or deployed in Northern Ireland); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 37.2402(l)(g) (West 1985) (requiring divestment by Michigan educational institutions
of any investments held in companies operating in the Soviet Union).
94 See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 24-3-416 (Supp. 1987) (requiring divestment within
four years by fiduciaries for the public employee retirement systems of funds invested in
any company doing business in or with South Africa); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 3-
13(f) (West Supp. 1988) (requiring divestment of all state funds invested in a company
doing business in South Africa; prior to July 1, 1987, the statute required divestment
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thorize investor-trustees generally to exercise their discretion to
promote political or social objectives of their own choosing.
Rather, they prohibit for political and social reasons certain kinds
of investments by state agencies or by entities managing state funds.
When the legislature orders trustees of state funds to invest those
funds in certain ways, the legislature implicitly, if not expressly, im-
munizes the trustee-investor from liability on a claim that the social
investing policy violates the duty of loyalty or the prudent investor
rule.95 This grant of immunity is not tantamount to giving blanket
authority to pursue social investing strategies. State legislatures
cannot authorize the managers of pension funds subject to ERISA
to undertake social investing strategies, since ERISA preempts all
state statutes regulating such funds. However, as for funds outside
the scope of ERISA, nothing prohibits a state legislature from im-
only if the corporation had not achieved one of the top two ratings for compliance with
the Sullivan Principles, the corporation did not supply "strategic products or services"
for the South African government, military, or police, and the corporation recognized
the right of all South African employees to organize and strike for economic or social
objectives); IOWA CODE ANN. § 12A. 1-12A.5 (West Supp. 1986) (requiring divestment
of state government, education, and retirement funds invested in banks making loans to
or companies doing business in South Africa, unless the companies have achieved one of
the top two Sullivan Principles performance ratings); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5,
§ 1951 (Supp. 1987) (requiring divestment of all state funds, including trust funds, in-
vested in banks which directly or indirectly have loans to South Africa, and in the
stocks of corporations doing business in or with South Africa); MD. ANN. CODE art.
73B, § 161 (Lexis) (placing a moratorium on the investment of state retirement and
pension funds in companies that do not meet the top two categories of the Sullivan
Principles); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 105.686 (Vernon Supp. 1988) (requiring divestment,
within five years, of state employees' retirement and other public trust funds of monies
invested in banks or companies that have "substantial investment" in South Africa);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 72-1270-1276 (Supp. 1984) (prohibiting the investment of any state
funds in companies not complying with the highest performance rating of the Sullivan
Principles or in stocks or bonds of financial institutions that make loans to the South
African government or its instrumentalities); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 35-10-12 (1985)
(preventing the investment of state monies or pension funds in companies doing busi-
ness in South Africa, and requiring divestment within four years of any such holdings,
unless the company is rated in the highest category of the Sullivan Principles and does
not supply strategic products to the South African military or police).
95 See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 24-3-416(g) (Supp. 1987) (providing for indemnifica-
tion of fiduciaries of public employee retirement system in connection with claims, ac-
tions, etc. commenced as result of divestment); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 105.686(2) (Vernon
Supp. 1988) (providing for immunity for trustees of retirement funds or school under-
taking voluntary divestment for losses resulting from the divestment required or sug-
gested by state statute). The New Jersey Attorney General reached this conclusion
when expressing an opinion on what constitutes "doing business" in South Africa under
the New Jersey statute requiring certain pension funds to divest. He opined that the
statute modified the prudent investor rule. Op. N.J. Att'y Gen., No. 1 1985 (Dec. 19,
1985) (Westlaw).
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munizing private trustees from liability for divesting trust assets
from South Africa-related investments or for following a more gen-
eral social investing strategy. Where South Africa divestment has
occurred without specific statutory authorization, divesting trustees
have presumably calculated the risk that their actions might be
challenged and concluded that the risk is insignificant.
III
THE EFFECT OF DIVESTMENT ON PORTFOLIO
PERFORMANCE: A FINANCIAL ANALYSIS
A trustee-investor's decision to divest stock held in companies
that do business in South Africa may affect several aspects of the
portfolio, including composition, risk and return, transaction, li-
quidity, and administrative costs, and management style. Each of
these potential effects was addressed in one or more of the ten previ-
ously published empirical studies on the effects of divestment.96
Most of these studies were summarized and reviewed in a 1985
report published by the Investor Responsibility Research Center
(IRRC).97 Four of the studies are particularly significant: the 1979
Rudd study;98 a series of four investigations in 1983 and 1984 by
Trinity Investment Management Corporation;99 the 1984 Wagner,
Emkin, and Dixon study (hereinafter Wagner); and the 1986
Grossman and Sharpe study. 1 The other studies suffer from one
or more significant empirical defects and therefore will not receive
significant attention here.
0 2
Before proceeding with a synthesis and analysis of these studies
and a discussion of their significance, two points are noteworthy.
96 See citations supra note 7.
97 IRRC Report, supra note 7. The IRRC study performed no independent empirical
work, but instead drew conclusions and inferences from existing empirical studies about
the advisability of divesting South Africa-related securities.
98 See Rudd, supra note 7.
99 The four studies are titled Structuring Portfolios from a South Africa-Free Uni-
verse (March 1983); Presentation to a Conference on South Africa-Free Investment
Policy (December 1983); Trinity's Insights about Managing Money under a South Af-
rica-Free Policy (May 1984); Investment Implications of South Africa Divestiture (Oc-
tober 1984). These four studies are based on Trinity's experience in managing a small
South Africa-free portfolio for Michigan State University and its examination of the
divestment impact on two larger pension funds-those of Washington, D.C. and the
State of New Jersey. See IRRC Report, supra note 7, at 14-18.
100 See Wagner, supra note 7.
101 See Grossman & Sharpe, supra note 7.
102 The various studies and their methodological flaws are discussed in the IRRC
Report, supra note 7, at 5-21.
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First, although the empirical findings of these studies exhibit a fair
amount of consistency, including unanimity on some questions, ma-
jor differences on important issues exist. Differences regarding
transaction costs are particularly significant. Moreover, while em-
pirical results on historical portfolio risk and return have been fairly
consistent, interpretation of those results has not. As a result, con-
clusions about the overall effect of South Africa divestment on port-
folio performance vary. However, we believe that some of these
differences in conclusions can be reconciled, and some of the con-
clusions can be disregarded altogether. Ultimately, as we shall
demonstrate, a clearer picture of the effect of South Africa divest-
ment on portfolio performance emerges.
Second, most studies have analyzed divestment's effect on portfo-
lio risk and return only from a historical perspective. Of course,
only the past is subject to empirical investigation. However, most
studies fail to take the next, and crucial, step of considering the
effects of South African divestment itself on future portfolio per-
formance. In particular, most studies do not take into account the
effect of ongoing divestment on the market, which is important
since most divestments will occur only after other investors have
already begun to implement a divestment strategy. Two studies did
speculate on the impact of divestment on equilibrium risk and re-
turn features,"°3 and these forecasts deserve special attention. In
the sections which follow, we consider both the historical evidence
and the potential effects of ongoing divestment activities on portfo-
lio performance. First, however, we examine divestment's effect on
portfolio composition. ,
A. The Effects of Investment on Portfolio Composition
South African divestment's most obvious impact is its effect on
portfolio composition. When a large portion of the investment uni-
verse is excluded, a question arises as to whether viable portfolios
can be constructed from the unexcluded securities. For example, a
divestment strategy requiring the investor to ignore all corporations
except those domiciled in Douglas County, Kansas, makes con-
struction of a diverse portfolio impossible. A divestment strategy's
impact on portfolio composition ultimately depends on that strat-
egy's characteristics, including the number of stocks excluded, the
kinds of stocks excluded, the operating and financial characteristics
of excluded and nonexcluded stocks, and whether the excluded
103 See Grossman & Sharp, supra note 7; Rudd, supra note 7.
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stocks have common characteristics that would distort portfolio
composition in some irreparable way.
A threshold difficulty in evaluating South Africa divestment im-
pact on portfolio composition is determining exactly what "divest-
ing from South Africa-related companies" means. South Africa
divestment's commonly stated purpose is to sell stock in companies
that "do business" in South Africa, but there is no agreement on
which companies fit this description." Various compilations in-
clude anywhere from 201 to 539 companies;1 ° 5 the figure of 6,000
companies has appeared in some discussions. 106 Also, the number
is fluid, since companies enter and leave South Africa over time. 1
0 7
Thus, determining precisely how many companies will be excluded
by a South Africa divestment strategy is not possible. Nonetheless,
the term "doing business" in South Africa usually connotes direct
investment in the country, meaning the physical presence of affili-
ates or subsidiaries, and somewhere between 200 and 350 United
States companies fit this description.
104 In New Jersey, confusion over this matter resulted in a request to the Attorney
General for an opinion on what constitutes "doing business" in South Africa under the
New Jersey statute. He concluded that "doing business" required a continuous business
presence in the country. Thus, merely sending goods to or receiving goods from South
Africa would not constitute doing business. See Op. N.J. Att'y Gen., No. 1-1985 (Dec.
19, 1985) (Westlaw). Yet, considerable uncertainty exists over how many companies
have a continuous business presence there. See infra note 105.
105 The United States Consulate General's List of companies doing business in South
Africa, which was relied upon in Meidinger Asset Planning Services, Inc., District of
Columbia Special Investment Study South Africa Proposal (Mar. 31, 1983), listed 201
companies. However, Arthur D. Little, Inc., in its Eighth Report on the Signatory
Companies to the Sullivan Principles (1984), named 281 companies and noted that 40
more companies probably belonged on the list. The Investor Responsibility Research
Center published a list in 1982 which identified approximately 272 companies as doing
business in South Africa, although the report also stated that approximately 400 compa-
nies operate subsidiaries or affiliates in South Africa. IRRC, IRRC Directory of U.S.
Corporations in South Africa (May, 1982). A January 1985 IRRC list identified 284
U.S. companies as having operations in South Africa. IRRC Report, supra note 7, App.
A. In 1984 the IRRC reportedly identified between 30 and 300 companies, depending
on how the South African prohibition is imposed, as "South Africa-related." An un-
dated list distributed in 1984 by the Conference in Solidarity with the Liberation Strug-
gles of the Peoples of South Africa listed 539 companies. See generally R. SCHOTLAND,
DIVERGENT INVESTING OF PENSION FUNDS AND UNIVERSITY ENDOWMENTS: KEY
POINTS ABOUT THE PRAGMATICS, AND Two CURRENT CASE STUDIES, in J.
LANGBEIN, supra note 5, at 46-47 (reporting that various lists have identified 281, 229,
287, 270, and 201 companies as doing business in South Africa).
106See IRRC, IRRC Directory of U.S. Corporations in South Africa (May, 1982)
("more than 6,000 do business there through sales agents or licensing agreements").
107 In recent months, new investment in South Africa has dwindled to virtually noth-
ing. The only significant movement comes from firms leaving the country.
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Thus, one divestment strategy might be to sell stock in all compa-
nies that have direct investment in the country, utilizing one of the
established lists of United States corporations doing business in
South Africa. Less restrictive strategies are possible as well, such as
divesting stock in companies having direct investment in the coun-
try and which do not comply with one of the two top compliance
categories of the Sullivan Principles rating system.0'0 Another
strategy might be to divest stock held in companies that sell goods
or services to th-e South African government. in short, various
ways exist to determine whether a particular stock is "South Africa-
related," and this choice directly affects the ease of constructing a
South Africa-free portfolio.
108 The Sullivan Principles are a code of conduct developed by Rev. Leon Sullivan in
1977 for companies doing business in South Africa. Companies that voluntarily agree
to adhere to the code are expected to meet certain standards concerning desegregation
of workplaces, pay, medical care, housing, nondiscriminatory hiring, training for non-
whites, and the promotion of trade unions. The companies' activities are monitored by
Arthur D. Little, Inc., which annually releases a compliance report. Of the 238 United
States companies doing business in South Africa, 153 have signed the Principles. Ap-
proximately 110 of those companies reported their activities during the last reporting
period. Of those 110 companies, 34 companies were "Category I," which means "mak-
ing good progress," 65 were "Category II," which means "making progress," and 18
were "Category III," which means "needs to become more active." Some companies
were listed in multiple categories. See Chron. of Higher Educ., Dec. 17, 1986, at 39,
col. 1.
Recently, the Principles were strengthened to require that signatory companies do
more to oppose apartheid. As revised, the Principles contemplate corporate civil diso-
bedience against apartheid laws and increased efforts to eliminate laws and customs that
oppress nonwhite workers. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1986, at D22, col. 1. See generally
Sullivan, Agents for Change: The Mobilization of Multinational Companies in South
Africa, 15 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 427 (1983).
Controversy exists over whether the Principles have assisted the struggle against
apartheid. See, e.g., Myers, U.S. Domestic Controversy over American Business in South
Africa, in THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND SOUTH AFRICA: PUBLICS, ELITES, AND POLI-
CYMAKING PROCESSES 74-75 (198 1) (Principles have had limited beneficial effect); Paul,
The Inadequacy of Sullivan Reporting, Bus. & Soc'Y REV. 61 (Spring 1986) (Sullivan
Principle reporting system is "seriously flawed"); Weedon, The Evolution of Sullivan
Principle Compliance, Bus. & Soc'v REV. 56 (Spring 1986) (Sullivan Principles signa-
tory program has been "catalyst" in the struggle to end inequalities in South Africa).
In December 1986, Rev. Sullivan vowed to mount a full-scale divestment campaign if
apartheid were not abolished by May 31, 1987. See Chron. of Higher Educ., Dec. 17,
1986, at 39, col. 1. In June 1987, Rev. Sullivan urged all U.S. firms to leave South
Africa within nine months and recommended that the Reagan Administration break its
remaining trade and diplomatic ties with that country. N.Y. Times, June 4, 1987, at I.,
col. 6; Wall St. J., June 4, 1987, at 2, ol. 2; N.Y. Times, June 1, 1987, at 23, col. 1.
Rev. Sullivan's changed strategy received a cautious response from institutional inves-
tors. According to one report, fund managers claimed they could not support total
divestment as a means to spur corporate withdrawal, because of legal obligations im-
posed by the prudent investor rule. N.Y. Times, June 8, 1987, at 26, col. 5.
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Table 1 presents a summary of South Africa divestment's possible
portfolio effects.' 9 The universes typically employed in the various
studies are the Standard and Poor's 500 (S&P 500) or the entire
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Although the studies' analyti-
cal procedures differ, divestment's overall impact on portfolio com-
position is qualitatively consistent across the studies. Furthermore,
that impact is dramatic. As Table 1 shows, if all South Africa-re-
lated firms were divested, about forty percent of the NYSE would
be eliminated. The IRRC estimates that about one-third of the
market value of all stocks in the United States corporations would
be eliminated.11 ° The typical American firm with operations in
South Africa is a very large, relatively stable, multinational com-
pany whose stock has a below-average level of risk. Approximately
thirty of the top fifty S&P 500 stocks by market value would be
ineligible for investment under the broadest definition of a South
Africa-related company. As Table 1 indicates, in some industries,
virtually all of the largest firms would be ineligible for investment.
TABLE 1
SUMMARY OF EFFECT OF EXTREME SOUTH AFRICAN
DIVESTMENT ON PORTFOLIO COMPOSITION
CHARACTERISTICS
Study Findings
Harvard (1978) Almost all stocks in six major U.S. industry
groups were excluded.
Rudd (1979) Forty-three percent of the S&P 500 market
capitalization was excluded. Thirty-nine
percent of the NYSE market capitalization
was excluded.
U.S. Trust of Boston More than eighty percent of the companies in
(1982) the following industry groups were excluded:
aerospace, autos and trucks, chemicals, drugs,
hospital supplies, office and business
equipment, international oil.
109 Since the estimates cited in Table 1 were prepared, some very significant compa-
nies have withdrawn from South Africa (for example, CBS, Eaton, GTE, General
Electric, and Phillips Petroleum), and other significant companies have announced
plans to withdraw (e.g., Coca-Cola, General Motors, Procter & Gamble). N.Y. Times,
Oct. 21, 1986, at D30, col. 1. See supra note 21. Thus, the composition effects set forth
in Table 1 are more severe than those which would exist now or which will exist in the
future, due to the trend favoring withdrawal from South Africa.










Wagner et al. (1984)
Grossman and Sharpe
(1986)
Excluded companies tended to have lower
debt levels, lower earnings variability, lower
betas (risk), and larger market capitalization
than South Africa-free companies.
Twenty-nine of the top fifty S&P companies
were excluded. Forty percent or more of the
companies in the following S&P industries
were excluded: major electrical equipment,
machinery (construction and material
handling), automobiles, chemicals, beverages
(soft drinks), hospital supplies, drugs.
More than fifty percent of all U.S. traded
equities were excluded. Excluded securities
were about twice as large, from a market
capitalization and trading volume standpoint,
than South Africa-free stocks. More than
eighty percent of the market capitalization in
the following industries were excluded:
international oil, drugs, office equipment,
chemicals, automobiles.
Thirty-one of the largest fifty U.S. companies
were excluded. Forty-nine of the largest 100
U.S. companies were excluded.
Forty-six percent of the S&P 500 market
capitalization was excluded. Thirty-seven
percent of the NYSE market capitalization
was excluded. The average South Africa-free
stock was almost thirty percent smaller than
the average NYSE firm. Excluded stocks
tended to be in technological capital goods
and consumer growth stocks.
At first glance, Table 1 seems to show that investor-trustees
forced to exclude South Africa-related stocks have a hopeless task
in attempting to achieve a sufficiently diverse portfolio. Several
facts weigh against that inference, however. First, the studies re-
ported in Table 1 exclude South Africa-related companies in an ex-
treme way. Typically, nonbanking firms having any direct
investments in South Africa were excluded regardless of whether
the firms had signed the Sullivan Principles. Bank holding compa-
nies reporting any outstanding South African loans or failing to re-
spond to the IRRC query about their South African loan activities
were also excluded. According to Grossman and Sharpe, if firms
complying with the top two Sullivan Principles categories are ex-
cluded from the South Africa-related category, the percentages of
market capitalization eliminated from the investment universe
drops to about seven percent for the NYSE and nine percent for the
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S&P 500. l1 Thus, for portfolios whose South Africa restrictions
are less constrained, the impact of the exclusionary limitations on
portfolio composition are enormously reduced.
A second factor mitigating the facial significance of Table 1 is
that the universe of securities available to portfolio managers is
broader than that shown in the table. American equity markets are
large and varied. Therefore, results like those in Table 1 showing
exclusions of large percentages of a particular market segment (such
as the S&P 500) overstate the divestment effect because the studies
have not examined all equity markets. The American Stock Ex-
change and unlisted securities in over-the-counter markets are also
important to portfolio managers. Furthermore, the existing studies
ignore all foreign securities except those traded in United States
markets. Obtaining information about foreign securities and ascer-
taining the extent to which foreign companies are involved in South
Africa is considerably more difficult. Nevertheless, the fact remains
that large groups of available and interesting securities have not
been analyzed closely in the divestment studies performed thus
far. 1
1 2
Finally, and most important, even if the most severe form of di-
vestment is undertaken, the information in Table 1 does not guaran-
tee that South Africa-free portfolios will be materially
disadvantaged from the standpoints of risk and return. As dis-
cussed more fully in the following two sections, portfolio theory,
which describes the effects of combining securities into portfolios,
frequently confounds intuition. Even within overly narrow stock
universes, such as those excluding smaller exchanges, foreign mar-
kets, and unlisted securities, the empirical evidence shows that the
remaining South Africa-free stocks can be combined into portfolios
that provide risk and return levels competitive with those of the
unrestricted universe of stocks. Therefore, it is erroneous to con-
clude that South Africa-free portfolios are materially disadvantaged
in terms of risk and return based solely on the fact that portfolio
composition is constrained. 113
111 Grossman & Sharpe, supra note 7, at 17.
112 See Pensions & Investment Age, Dec. 14, 1987, at 31 (reporting that the South
Africa-free Morgan Stanley Capital International Europe Australia Far East index de-
veloped by Alliance Capital Management would have boosted international equity re-
turns by over 300 basis points during the past four years; Alliance treasurer states that
"there are enough stocks in the [South Africa-free] universe to cope" and that investing
on a global basis further reduces the impact of investment restrictions).
113 It is on this proposition that our analysis departs from the inference drawn by
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In short, the fact that a divestment strategy constrains the inves-
tor-trustee in constructing a portfolio says nothing about con-
straints on profitability or effects on risk. The more important
question concerns how divestment affects portfolio risk and return.
In the next section, we consider whether portfolios free of South
Africa-related stocks can earn rates of return competitive with un-
restricted portfolios, without incurring additional risk.
B. Historical Risk and Return Results
A modicum of consistency exists in the evidence used in the stud-
ies of the risk and return impact of South African divestment.
However, the diversity of approaches and particular weaknesses in
the methodology of each make comparison of the studies difficult
and sometimes impossible. Moreover, the consistency in the evi-
dence does not carry over to the conclusions.
Substantial controversy exists with regard to the effect of divest-
ment on portfolio risk and return. On a more fundamental level,
the controversy has two aspects: first, disagreement over what con-
stitutes an appropriate experimental design; and second, disagree-
ment about the impact of divestment on future portfolio results.
The arguments over experimental design concern whether the ex-
isting studies were conducted in ways that truly reflect the impact
of divestment on portfolio risk and return. The second area of disa-
greement concerns issues necessarily more speculative because they
relate to future events. The experimental design controversy is cov-
ered in this section, and the disagreement over future results is de-
ferred to the next.
Each empirical study published to date followed one of two
paths. One approach, followed in the 1979 Rudd study and the
1980 study by the Council on Economic Priorities commissioned by
Langbein and Posner in their important article in the Michigan Law Review. See
Langbein & Posner, supra note 5. They agree that a social-investing portfolio will have
the same return as an unconstrained portfolio. Id. at 92-93. However, they do not be-
lieve that a social-investing portfolio can be created that would not have "a substantial
increment in risk." Id. at 89. Langbein and Posner did not provide the details of the
study they commissioned, which they cited in support of their conclusion, see id. at 88-
89; thus it is not possible to appraise the study's methodology. It should, of course, be
noted that Langbein and Posner did not have the benefit of the analysis in the empirical
studies published after 1980, which this Article discusses. See id. at 92 (referring to the
-(very limited) empirical studies that have been made of social-investment portfolios"
as of the date of their publication).
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the State of California Retirement Systems,1 14 attempted to con-
struct portfolios of South Africa-free stocks that mimicked a market
index portfolio. If the mimicking could be done perfectly, the im-
plication was that South Africa divestment restrictions are harmless
to portfolios. Both studies used a financial modeling program
designed to construct an optimal portfolio from a given set of stocks
that would closely track a designated market index. Both studies
chose the S&P 500, and both created a South Africa-free subset of
stocks from S&P 500 stocks. The main empirical results from the





Study Beta of Residual Risk
Rudd (1979) 1.00 2.21%
Council on Economic 1.01 1.90%
Priorities
Beta is a financial risk measure that reflects how risky an asset
(here, the South Africa-free portfolio) is relative to a market index
(here, the S&P 500). A portfolio with a beta of 1.00 has risk equal
to the market index and would be expected to closely track price
movements in the market index. Standard deviation of residual risk
is another measure of tracking precision. The closer the standard
deviation of residual risk is to zero, the better the tracking. Com-
mercial index funds are reported to have standard deviations of
residual risk of between 0.5 percent and 1.5 percent. As the data in
Table 2 show, both studies ultimately achieved South Africa-free
portfolios that tracked the S&P 500 closely. The mimicking was
not perfect, as the standard deviation of residual risk exceeded the
norms for commercial index funds. However, the South Africa-free
tracking error was not substantial, leading Rudd to conclude that
"the effect on portfolio risk of excluding the companies operating in
South Africa, 'the 150 to 200 major U.S. companies', is, contrary to
intuition, not particularly important."
' 15
114See Rudd, supra note 7; Report by the Council on Economic Priorities (1980),
summarized in IRRC Report, supra note 7, at 8-9.
115 Rudd, supra note 7, at 9 (emphasis omitted).
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The significance of the two studies' results is diminished by the
fact that, as Rudd acknowledged in his own paper' 6 and as the
IRRC noted in commenting on both studies,"' 7 the research focused
on passive as opposed to active portfolio management styles. "' Ac-
cordingly, it is difficult to infer from these studies how active portfo-
lio managers would fare under divestment. This important question
is addressed in a later section." 9
The approach followed by the rest of the published studies com-
pared the performance of "unconstrained" portfolios and "South
Africa-free" (and sometimes "South Africa-related") portfolios.120
This comparison is a more direct means of assessing the effects of
divestment. Unlike the market index-mimicking approach, the
portfolio comparison allows investigation of active portfolio man-
agement styles. Table 3, which follows, summarizes the risk and
return findings of six representative studies.
TABLE 3
PORTFOLIO RISK/RETURN RESULTS
South Africa- South Africa- Unconstrained
A. Risk = Beta Free Portfolio Related Portfolio Portfolio
Average Average Average
Annual Annual Annual
Study Return Beta Return Beta Return Beta
Daniels & Bell
Capital Mgt(1977-81) 6.70% 1.35 ............... 6.30% 1.26
U.S. Trust of
Boston (1972-81) 10.74% 0.94 ............... 7.92% 1.00
Trinity Investment
Mgt (1974-81) 15.40% 1.16 13.6% 1.12 14.00% 1.10
116 Id. at 5-6.
117 IRRC Report, supra note 7, at 7-9.
118 Passive management refers to strategies with low trading frequency; active man-
agement refers to strategies with high trading frequency.
119 See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
120 A "South Africa-free portfolio" is one that excludes stocks of companies that do
business in South Africa; in other words, the South Africa-free portfolio excludes South
Africa-related companies. A "South Africa-related portfolio" is one consisting solely of
stock in companies that do business in South Africa. Thus, a South Africa-free portfo-
lio and a South Africa-related portfolio are mutually exclusive. An "unconstrained
portfolio" is any unfettered combination of the South Africa-free and the South Africa-
related stocks. In practice, investment managers operate either an unconstrained port-




(1973-82) ........................ 5.4% 0.88 6.60% 1.00







Portfolio ..................... 12.8% 10.8%
Unconstrained
Portfolio ..................... 6.0% 7.2%
Average Annual Standard Deviation of




Portfolio .................... 3.922% 15.071%
Unconstrained
Portfolio .................... 3.611% 14.788%
The studies in Panel A of Table 3 measured risk using the con-
cept of beta, as described above; the larger the beta value, the riskier
the portfolio. The studies in Panel B used rate of return standard
deviations to measure portfolio risk; the larger the standard devia-
tion, the riskier the portfolio.12 1 All the studies in Table 3 covered
some segment of the 1970s and early 1980s. The Grossman and
Sharpe study covered the longest period-from 1960 to 1983. The
findings of the studies were consistent: while South Africa-free
portfolios were riskier, they earned higher rates of return than the
unconstrained portfolios during the time periods studied.' 2 2
It would be presumptuous to conclude at this point, however,
that South Africa-free stocks outperformed unconstrained portfo-
lios. As Grossman and Sharpe noted, a risk-adjusted comparison of
121 The standard deviations computed by Capital Management Sciences and by
Grossman and Sharpe are technically not the same thing. Consequently, it is incorrect
to compare numerical risk levels between the Capital Management Services and Gross-
man and Sharpe studies.
122 More precisely, the South Africa-free portfolios earned higher rates of return and
were riskier than the South Africa-related portfolios during the time periods studied.
Since unconstrained portfolios are merely combinations of South Africa-free and South
Africa-related stocks, the unconstrained portfolios had lower returns and lower risk
than the South Africa-free stocks.
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results is necessary.123 Without such a comparison, it is not possi-
ble to determine whether the extra rate of return earned on the
South Africa-free portfolios was sufficient to compensate investment
managers for the extra risk to which their portfolios were exposed.
The only study attempting to furnish an answer to this question is
the Grossman and Sharpe study.
Because the South Africa-free portfolio is riskier than the uncon-
strained portfolio, Grossman and Sharpe mixed United States
Treasury bills (which are riskiess, except for inflation) into the
South Africa-free portfolio up to the point where the South Africa-
free and the NYSE portfolios had equal risk (that is, equal standard
deviations of excess return). Then they compared the return of the
unconstrained portfolio with that of the portfolio of carefully mixed
Treasury bills and South Africa-free stocks. Because these two
portfolios were designed to have equal risk, a higher rate of return
for one portfolio would signify a risk-adjusted rate of return advan-
tage to that portfolio. The results of Grossman and Sharpe's experi-
ment are set forth in Table 4, which follows. After adjusting the
TABLE 4
GROSSMAN AND SHARPE EQUALIZED RISK RESULTS
(1960-83)
Average Annual Standard Deviation of
Excess Return Annual Excess Return
South Africa-free Equal
Risk Portfolio' 3.848 14.788%
Unconstrained NYSE
Portfolio 3.661% 14.788%
Difference: 0. 187%b 0.000%
Source: Grossman & Sharpe, Financial Implications of South Africa Divestment, 42
FIN. ANALYSTS J. 15, 23 (July-Aug. 1986).
98.12% original South Africa-free portfolio and 1.88% T-Bills.
Reflecting a rate of return advantage for the South Africa-free Equal Risk Portfolio.
South Africa-free portfolio to make its risk equal to that of the un-
constrained portfolio, the South Africa-free portfolio outperformed
the unconstrained portfolio by almost twenty basis points per
year. 124
Probing this somewhat surprising conclusion further, Grossman
123 See Grossman & Sharpe, supra note 7, at 23.
124 A basis point is 1/100 of one percent of a portfolio's rate of return.
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and Sharpe examined the portfolios using a multiple regression
technique to isolate what they called the "South Africa Factor."
They estimated how well South Africa-related stocks performed rel-
ative to South Africa-free stocks while holding constant the effects
of industry classification, dividend yield, beta (risk), and size.
Grossman and Sharpe investigated this relationship over their en-
tire time period (1960-83) and over three subperiods. Their results
are shown in Table 5, which follows. A positive South Africa factor
means South Africa-related stocks performed better than South Af-
rica-free stocks, holding the effects of industry, dividend yield, beta,
and firm size constant:
TABLE 5
SOUTH AFRICA FACTOR






SOURCE: Grossman & Sharpe, Financial Implications of South African Divestment, 42
FIN. ANALYSTS J. 15, 24 (July-Aug. 1986).
A positive (negative) return means South Africa-related stocks performed better
(worse) than South Africa-free stocks.
Over the entire period, the South Africa-related stocks out-
performed the South Africa-free stocks. The superior performance
existed throughout the 1960s and into the mid-1970s, at which time
the relationship reversed and the South Africa-free stocks out-
performed the South Africa-related stocks. Although the only "sta-
tistically significant""12 results Grossman and Sharpe found were
those for the period 1960-75, when the South Africa-related stocks
outperformed the South Africa-free stocks, the authors concluded:
"The underperformance of [South Africa-related] stocks in the
1980s, while of less significance statistically, is nonetheless of suffi-
cient magnitude to reject any hypothesis that [South Africa-related]
stocks have substantially outperformed [other] stocks with similar
125 Classical statisticians use a "t-statistic" to determine whether the difference be-
tween a measured average value and zero is "significant." The rule of thumb is that
only values with absolute t-statistics greater than 2.0 are statistically significant. See
Grossman & Sharpe, supra note 7, at 24.
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characteristics in the recent past."' 26 Thus, the Grossman and
Sharpe results refute the claim that South Africa-free stocks have
been inferior performers compared to the rest of the market in re-
cent years. More important, their results support the proposition
that a South Africa-free portfolio can be managed to achieve com-
petitive rates of return without unacceptable risk levels.
At first glance, Table 5's "South Africa Factor" results for the
entire period (1960-83) seem inconsistent with the results in Table
4. Table 5 indicates a rate of return advatage to Sout., Africa-
related stocks, while Table 4 indicates an advantage to South Af-
rica-free stocks. Grossman and Sharpe explained this discrepancy
by noting that the South Africa-free strategy has a "small stock
bias." Recent finance studies have found a puzzling empirical regu-
larity that suggests relatively small stocks earn risk-adjusted rates of
return in excess of their expected levels.' 27 Since South Africa-free
portfolios have a small stock bias, the small stock empirical regular-
ity is automatically incorporated into those portfolios, enhancing
their risk/return profiles, as the results in Table 4 show. The South
Africa Factor results in Table 5, however, controlled the small
stock effect because Grossman and Sharpe manipulated the "firm
size" variable.' 2 '
The conclusions that seem to follow from the empirical studies
are counterintuitive, perhaps even startling. It is possible to design
a South Africa-free portfolio that tracks the overall market closely.
It is also possible to form South Africa-free portfolios with levels of
risk and return that are competitive with portfolios unconstrained
by South Africa social investment policies.' 29
However, before concluding that divestment of South Africa-re-
lated stocks has no adverse financial repercussions, several other
matters need consideration. Simply because one can structure a
South Africa-free portfolio that is competitive with an uncon-
strained portfolio does not mean it is costless to do so. Sales in the
market pursuant to divestment affect the market itself, thus chang-
126 Id.
127 See Banz, The Relationship Between Return and Market Value of Common Stocks,
9 J. FIN. ECON. 3-18 (Mar. 1981); Cook & Rozeff, Size and Earnings/Price Ratio Anom-
alies: One Effect or Two?, 19 J. FIN. QuANr. ANALYSIS 449-66 (Dec. 1984).
128 For a further discussion of the importance of the small stock issue, see infra notes
157-63 and accompanying text.
129 It is obvious that restricting the discretion of a fiduciary who makes optimal in-
vestment decisions cannot improve the performance of the fiduciary's portfolio. How-
ever, the financial empirical evidence shows that South Africa-free portfolios can be
managed to achieve competitive returns without increasing risk.
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ing the environment in which the costs of divestment must be evalu-
ated. In other words, the future impact of divestment on portfolio
risk and return must be assessed. Divestment also has transaction
costs, tends to reduce portfolio liquidity, and may increase adminis-
trative costs. Finally, the relationship between portfolio manage-
ment issues and divestment must be explored. These topics are
considered in the next subsection.
C. The Potential Effects of Implementing Divestment on Portfolio
Performance
1. Future Risk and Return Projections
The previous subsection concerned historical risk and return rela-
tionships of United States stocks. Data on these relationships are
important because they help determine whether social investing
strategies are feasible without sacrificing return or incurring addi-
tional risk.
The picture that emerges from studying historical relationships is
incomplete, however, because it fails to account for the future ef-
fects of ongoing divestment activities. Divestment strategies are im-
plemented at various times and in various forms, and each
divestment potentially has some effect on the market in which other
subsequent divestments will occur. Thus, another important-and
extremely difficult-task is assessing what future impact, if any, di-
vestment will have on American stock markets.
The answer to this crucial question is elusive, and diverse opin-
ions have been voiced. At one extreme, it is claimed divestment will
have dramatic effects on related stocks and, more generally, on
portfolio management.13° At the other extreme, some believe the
divestment movement will not influence stock prices in any major
130 See, e.g., Broderick, The Prudent Person vs Divestment, 8 DIRECTORS & BOARDS
4 (Summer 1984) (asserting that South Africa divestment will increase risk and reduce
return); Love, On South Africa, 41 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 14-16 (May-June 1985) (specu-
lates on the probable negative impact on South Africa-free portfolios from a long run
perspective); Tell, The Apartheid Factor, BARRON'S, Aug. 19, 1985 at 18, 20, 55 (pessi-
mistically considers the possible impact of divestment pressures on South Africa-related
stocks); Pensions & Investment Age, Oct. 5, 1987, at 36 (reporting on opposing views
on effect of South Africa divestment on portfolio performance); see also Reynolds &
Cohen, Divestiture in South Africa May Become an Investment Strategy (letter to the
editor), N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1985, at 26, col. 3 (chairmen of District of Columbia
Retirement Board and its investment subcommittee opine that widespread divestment
by pension funds, endowments, foundations, and employment benefit plans could ad-
versely affect stock prices).
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way.1 31 Both positions are explored below.
At the outset, it should be noted that in both scenarios, the analy-
sis and results are fully consistent with the empirical evidence re-
lated to the "efficient market" theory, 132 a concept capturing one of
the prominent features of modem financial markets. The efficient
market theory asserts that securities are properly priced by inves-
tors, in aggregate, based upon current information available con-
cerning the securities' underlying operating and financial
characteristics. As a result, assets are not seriously tnisprIced in
markets with large numbers of well-informed, profit-seeking inves-
tors who are relatively free to pursue their investment objectives.
The efficient market theory is widely believed to be an accurate de-
scription of security pricing, at least to a first approximation.
33
The theory helps explain the impact, both short-run and long-run,
of both narrow and widespread divestment.
a. The Case for No Stock Market Effects
In an efficient market, narrow divestment would not significantly
affect the stock market. 134 Any selling pressure resulting from di-
vestment may momentarily cause price declines in South Africa-
131 Pittel, Divested Stocks Aren't Cheap, FORBES, Feb. 24, 1986, at 136 (observing
that South Africa-related stocks have been marginally affected by divestment to date);
Rubinstein, Divestment Injuries No One But the Divestor, (letter to editor), N.Y. Times,
Oct. 18, 1985, at 30, col. 3 (stockbroker opines that divestment only affects the seller of
stock, not the company).
132 The classic definition and exposition of market efficiency is found in Fama, Effi-
cient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383-427
(May 1970). For a discussion of efficient market theory in another legal context, see
Note, A Reconsideration of the Stock Market Exception to the Dissenting Shareholder's
Right of Appraisal, 74 MICH. L. REv. 1023, 1036-44 (1976).
133 There is, however, a growing literature on so-called "anomalies" that, at first
blush, appear inconsistent with market efficiency. See, e.g., Joy & Jones, Earnings Re-
ports and Market Efficiencies: An Analysis of the Contrary Evidence, 2 J. FIN. RE. 51-
63 (Spring 1979); Symposium on Size and Stock Returns, and Other Empirical Regulari-
ties, 12 J. FIN. ECON. (M. Jensen ed. June-Sept. 1983); Symposium on Some Anomalous
Evidence Regarding Market Efficiency, 6 J. FIN. ECON. (M. Jensen ed. June-Sept. 1978).
However, the majority of finance scholars argue that these anomalies are not evidence of
market inefficiency, but rather are indications that current financial asset pricing models
are misspecified. See, e.g., Ball, Anomalies in Relationships Between Securities' Yields
and Yield-Surrogates, 6 J. FIN. EON. 103-26 (June-Sept. 1978).
134 An ancillary condition is that economic and/or governmental restrictions placed
on South Africa-related companies will not materially affect or be perceived to affect
those companies. This latter condition is secondary in the sense that it is a potential
cause of widespread divestment and/or changed attitudes towards related stocks.
Nonetheless, it is most likely the magnitude of the overt divestment pressure or lack
thereof that will determine whether there are future divestment-driven stock market
impacts.
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related stocks, but any such declines would precipitate immediate
buy reactions from divestment-neutral investors. Similarly, excess
buying pressure from redeployment of divested funds may momen-
tarily cause price increases in South Africa-free stocks and immedi-
ately precipitate not only selling, but also short selling 135 activity
from divestment-neutral investors. In short, stock market "bar-
gains" created by divestment, whether underpriced South Africa-
related stocks or overpriced South Africa-free stocks, would be
eliminated quickly in an efficient market. Moreover, the chance
that divestment will occur over long periods of time enhances the
likelihood that limited divestment will not affect stock prices be-
cause divestment-neutral investors will have more time to adjust to
stock price discrepancies.
The foregoing discussion is predicated on a key assumption: that
divestment will not be sufficiently widespread to affect stocks in any
important way. Estimating the future extent of divestment is im-
possible, but the composition of publicly traded stock ownership
helps establish some limits on possible future divestment. A 1985
estimate of asset values of pension funds and university endow-
ments appears in Table 6, which follows.
Endowment and pension funds comprise over two-thirds of all
United States publicly traded stocks. As of August 1987, public
employee pension funds in thirteen states and over twenty-five cities
had divested, or scheduled for divestment, over $12.1 billion in
South Africa-related stocks.' 36 As of late 1987, approximately 135
college and university endowments had sold all or part of their
holdings in companies with operations in South Africa. Divested
funds totaled approximately $4 billion, about ten percent of all uni-
versity endowment assets. 13 7  Although these numbers seem large,
135 A short sale is the sale of a borrowed security; the seller does not own the stock at
time of sale.
136 American Committee on Africa, Public Investment and South Africa, supra note
92, at 1-17.
137 This figure is based on a reported statement of a representative of the American
Committee on Africa. N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1987, at B8, col. 3. The $4 billion figure
includes $3.1 billion worth of holdings in South Africa-related companies that the Uni-
versity of California Board of Regents voted to sell in July 1986. See Chron. Higher
Educ., July 30, 1986, at 1, col. 2. As of May 1986, about one hundred college and
university endowments had sold all or part of their holdings in companies with opera-
tions in South Africa, and these divested funds totaled about $445 million. See Chron.
Higher Educ., May 14, 1986, at 2, col. 3. Recently, the pace of university divestment
has slackened. From April 1985 to February 1987, seventy-five colleges divested, but
from February through December 1987, no more than a half-dozen have done so. N.Y.




ESTIMATES OF ASSET VALUES AS OF APRIL 1985
Percentage of
U.S. Publicly
$ Billions Traded Stocks
University endowment funds 40 2
Public employee pension funds 340 18
Corporate and union pension funds 980 52
1,30%~. 7 2
All U.S. publicly traded stocks 1,900 100
SOURCE: Smith, American Stocks Shrug Off Anti-Apartheid Pressure, WALL ST. J.,
April 30, 1985, at 34, Col. 1.
they represent only a small portion of the total market value of
South Africa-related stocks that ranges between $400 and $600
billion. 138
These figures illustrate the dimensions of the widespread versus
narrow divestment question. The institutions most likely to feel di-
vestment pressure are endowment and public employee pension
funds. If all endowment and public employee pension funds
divested all of their South Africa holdings, the divestment move-
ment would be widespread.1 39  If corporate and union pension
funds participate to any significant degree in the divestment move-
ment, characterizing divestment as widespread might be an
understatement.
Exactly how widespread divestment must become before some
price effects of South Africa-related stocks occur is an open ques-
tion. One commentator opined that divestment would not depress
the prices of South Africa-related stocks in a perfectly efficient mar-
ket unless nearly two-thirds of the market were divested." Cur-
rently, approximately $150 billion appears to be invested in stock
portfolios held by investors who are in the process of divesting at
138 On the conservative side, Tell, supra note 130, at 20, reported that the 114 S&P
500 stocks with South African ties had a total market value of $448 billion as of June
30, 1984. Grossman and Sharpe, supra note 7, at 17, estimated that the 205 companies
on the 1984 IRRC list of United States firms doing business in South Africa had a
combined market value of $570 billion.
139 See Table 6, supra text accompanying note 138. Assuming endowment and public
employee pension funds generally hold widely diversified "market" portfolios, these
funds today hold almost twenty percent of the aggregate shares of the South Africa-
related stocks.
140 Pittel, supra note 131, at 136.
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least a portion of their South Africa-related stocks. 141 This figure
represents less than eight percent of the aggregate market value of
publicly traded United States stocks. It seems fair to say that di-
vestment is, at least for the present, narrow. Yet the divestment
movement is clearly gaining momentum that is unlikely to abate
soon.' 42 Divestment may become more widespread over time. Un-
til then, however, any discernible impact on stock prices and rates
of return is unlikely.
b. The Case for Stock Market Effects
Many stock market analysts believe widespread divestment
would significantly impact stock prices and rates of return. Any
appraisal of their analyses must distinguish between the effects of
divestment in the short-run and in the long-run. That the divest-
ment movement is or will be sufficiently widespread so as to create
some noticeable price effect is assumed. This assumption, as al-
ready noted, is perhaps unwarranted.
Some analysts believe that a changing supply-demand balance
will provide the primary impetus to divestment-driven stock market
changes. 43 During the short-run, incremental selling pressure will
push down the price of South Africa-related stocks, and incremen-
tal buying pressure will push up the price of South Africa-free
stocks. The magnitude of these effects is entirely conjectural.' 44
141 N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1986, at D5, col. 2 (citing David Hauck, senior analyst at the
Investor Responsibility Research Center). Another commentator put the total portfolio
of institutions with South Africa-related restrictions on their investment policies at $260
billion. Lazzareschi, Activists Seeking to Shut 'Loopholes' in Divestiture, L.A. Times,
Jan. 19, 1987, pt. 1, at 8, col. 2 (citing Mitchell Investment Management Co.). At least
part of this increase is attributable to the mid-1980s increase in stock prices. However,
some of it is undoubtedly attributable to additional institutions adopting some sort of
South Africa investment policy.
142 It is unlikely that all United States corporations will suddenly withdraw from
South Africa, thereby mooting the divestment arguments. According to one report,
"[b]arring a bloodbath in South Africa, U.S. firms probably won't suddenly shut down
en masse and all leave at once. Instead, predicts one official, U.S. investment will en-
dure 'a long, continuing, slow decline.' " Kneale, Growing Dilemma: U.S. Firms Oper-
ating in South Africa Debate Whether to Stay or Go, Wall St. J., July 11, 1986, at 8, col.
I. It is also not likely that Congress will soon mandate the withdrawal of all United
States corporations from South Africa. On July 31, 1986, the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee defeated such a proposal on a nine to seven party-line vote. Roberts, Senate
Panel Rejects Divestment But Leans to Other Pretoria Curbs, N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1986,
at Al, col. 2.
143 See Tell, supra note 130, at 55.
144 Id. Steven Leuthold, the principal of a Minneapolis investment-strategy firm, re-
cently said: "Anybody who's got any brains is going to stay away from those stocks
until (the divestment selling) goes away." Id.
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However, buying pressure will likely affect South Africa-free stocks
more than selling pressure will affect South Africa-related stocks
because, on average, South Africa-related stocks have very large
capitalizations, and South Africa-free stocks have smaller capital-
izations. 45 In effect, some divesting portfolios will reallocate capi-
tal to stocks with much smaller capitalizations.
Grossman and Sharpe advanced a more subtle version of the sell-
ing pressure theory in justifying their prediction of future short-run
price declines in South Africa-related stocks. They reasoned that
South Africa-neutral investors could only be induced to "overload"
their portfolios with South Africa-related stocks by price incen-
tives.' 46 Consequently, according to Grossman and Sharpe, share
prices of South Africa-related stocks will fall until the divestment
movement is completed, 47 whereas share prices of South Africa-
free securities will rise during the divestment disequilibrium
period. 148
Regardless of which explanation for short-run price changes one
accepts, the final result is the same: prices of South Africa-related
stocks will be pushed downward, and prices of South Africa-free
stocks will be pushed upward. South Africa-free stocks would re-
flect favorable relative prices and rates of return in the short-run.
Accordingly, on the issue of the prudence and feasibility of divest-
ment, divesting portfolio managers will not be disadvantaged in the
short-run. Indeed, those managers who do not divest will suffer the
negative aspects of the relative price movements during this period.
Whether explicitly stated or not, the principal concern over the
effects of divestment relates to the long-run investment horizon.
Two postdivestment, long-run scenarios seem plausible. In the final
analysis, neither scenario implies any major long-term disadvantage
to South Africa-free portfolios.
Two kinds of long-run pressure will probably raise share prices of
South Africa-related stocks. First, the government and the public
will continuously pressure the management of South Africa-related
firms to divest.' 4 9 When a firm's management responds favorably
to the pressure to divest, the firm's stock should respond positively.
If divestment by management became widespread, an upward price
145 See Table 1, supra text accompanying note 11.
146 Grossman & Sharpe, supra note 7, at 26.
14 7 Id. at 27.
14S Id.
149 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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impact on what are now South Africa-related stocks should result.
By virtue of the arguments previously advanced concerning short-
run results,"'5 some decline in South Africa-free prices should also
occur.
The second source of long-run pressure results from the natural
attraction of South Africa-neutral investors for South Africa-related
stocks because of the risk and return advantages of these stocks rel-
ative to South Africa-free stocks. If divestment in the short-run
causes South Africa-related stock prices to fall and the South Af-
rica-free stock prices to rise, all while the underlying financial and
productive characteristics of firms are unchanged, investors indiffer-
ent to divestment would be induced to buy undervalued South Af-
rica-related stocks because long-run expected returns would be high
relative to risk. This pressure to buy would tend to boost prices of
South Africa-related stocks to predivestment levels, resulting in
long-run equilibrium, ceteris parabis.
Consider now the South Africa-free stocks. As discussed above,
shifting investor supply and demand functions and reallocation re-
sulting from divestment would probably drive South Africa-free
stock prices above their long-run equilibrium levels in the short-run.
However, in a perfect market,' 15 short-selling of overvalued South
Africa-free securities would reduce their prices to levels that would
yield a return consistent with their risk levels in the long-run. 152
Therefore, price premiums created by divestment would not last
long.
In actuality, short-selling is restricted by the requirement that
trustees maintain costly escrow accounts.' 53 In addition, thinly
traded securities are difficult to short-sell because brokers are often
unable to borrow the required certificates. 54 By definition, many
thinly traded securities will be South Africa-free stocks. As a result,
150 These arguments involve shifts in investor supply and demand functions and port-
folio rebalancing considerations.
151 A perfect market contains no transactions costs and imposes no restrictions on
investors' operations.
152 Unrestricted short-selling is an important arbitrage activity in a perfect market
because it puts downward pressure on prices. Overvalued securities will attract short-
selling until prices are reduced to their proper risk-return levels. Restrictions on short-
selling retard the process of downward price movement. The only arbitrage force left in
this latter situation is reduced demand.
153 Proceeds from short sales are not available to the investor, and margin deposits
are required.
154 Thinly traded securities also exacerbate another problem with short-selling: po-




restricted short-selling of South Africa-free stocks would create
price "superpremiums" in long-run equilibrium."' Finally, even if
no long-run price movements back toward predivestment levels of
either South Africa-free or South Africa-related stocks occurred,
South Africa-related stocks would probably enjoy some advantage
over South Africa-free stocks. Specifically, their expected cash-
flows relative to their prices would be greater in the postdivestment
period than in the predivestment period.
Grossman and Sharpe estimate a long-run rate of return advan-
tage to South Africa-related stocks of about forty-two basis points
per year, in extremis, as a result of divestment, ceteris parabis.15
6
Additionally, they estimate that South Africa-free portfolios will in-
herently reap the advantages of the anomalous small firm effect.
Therefore, the small firm advantage should provide a counterbal-
ancing gain to South Africa-free portfolios of about thirty-five basis
points per year. This counterbalance almost fully compensates for
whatever long-run rate of return advantage South Africa-related
stocks enjoy.' 57
Grossman and Sharpe's estimates of the prospective effects of di-
vestment are more useful qualitatively than quantitatively. In es-
sence, they propose that gains from the small firm effect will offset
losses from induced portfolio rebalancing.15 8 However, two recent
studies on the small firm effect suggest that the abnormally large
return attributable to small firm stocks are merely compensation for
market and firm characteristics peculiar to small firms. Stoll and
Whaley argue that the additional transaction costs associated with
investment in small firms negate much of the anomalous small firm
stock advantage.' 59 Chan, Chen, and Hsieh conclude that the small
firm effect is essentially explained by differences in failure risk
across firm sizes.1I° Therefore, the anomalous extra return received
by small firms is merely a risk premium earned for holding stocks
155 See Glenn, Super Premium Security Prices and Optimal Corporate Financing Deci-
sions, 31 J. FIN. 507, 508-09 (May 1976).
156 Grossman & Sharpe, supra note 7, at 27.
Id.
158 Id. at 25, 27.
159 Stoll & Whaley, Transactions Costs and the Small Firm Effect, 12 J. FIN. ECON.
57-59 (June 1983). Transactions costs are discussed in more detail at infra notes 164-83
and accompanying text.
160 See Chan, Chen & Hsieh, An Exploratory Investigation of the Firm Size Effect, 14
J. FIN. EON. 451, 470 (Sept. 1985).
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with greater risk of failure. 161
Whether these explanations 162 justify conclusions such as those
drawn by Grossman and Sharpe may be determined by reference to
efficient market theory. 163 Despite the results of Grossman and
Sharpe's study, if markets are efficient, investing in small firms
should not add anything to portfolio returns after adjusting for all
types of risk. Therefore, the extra return that South Africa-free
portfolios earn because of their inherent small firm bias constitutes
fair compensation for extra transaction costs or extra risk bearing.
On the other hand, if markets are inefficient, divestment portfolios
tend to reap the benefits of the small firm bias, an outcome consis-
tent with Grossman and Sharpe's results.
Thus, regardless of which of these two scenarios one accepts, re-
turns should be higher in divestment portfolios. In one instance,
higher return is fair compensation for incremental increased risk; in
the other instance, higher return is unaccompanied by increased
risk. In neither instance does divestment disadvantage the
portfolio.
To summarize, if the divestment movement does not become
widespread, divestment will have no price or rate of return impact
in either the short run or the long run. Therefore, divesting manag-
ers will not be penalized for pursuing a strategy of social investing.
If the divestment movement does become widespread, the main
short-run consequences of divestment are the imbalance of supply
and demand conditions for both South Africa-free and South Af-
rica-related stocks and disaffection with portfolio overweighing of
South Africa-related stocks by divestment-neutral investors. Both
conditions favor South Africa-free stocks relative to South Africa-
related stocks in the short-run. Therefore, South Africa-free portfo-
lios reward portfolio managers in the short-run. The main long-run
consequences in the widespread divestment scenario are more com-
plicated. Ceteris parabis, South Africa-related stocks may be ad-
vantaged relative to South Africa-free stocks. However, the long-
run, small firm bias inherent in South Africa-free portfolios would
tend to dissipate that advantage. Thus, even in the long-run, divest-
161 Analyses like those reported in Tables 2 through 5 use some form of variability
risk, which may not fully capture the risk failure dimension.
162 It is not yet clear whether the arguments advanced either by Stoll and Whaley or
by Chan, Chen, and Hsieh are empirically valid. More research is required before the
question can be resolved. Nevertheless, both studies provide believable explanations of
the small firm effect.
163 See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
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ing managers will not experience any adverse effects on portfolio
performance as a result of divestment.
2. Potential Additional Costs
Divestment's identifiable effects are not limited to impacts on risk
and return. Divestment potentially entails additional costs, some of
which are interdependent and most of which have not yet been esti-
mated with any precision. In this section, we examine transaction
costs, liquidity costs, administrative costs, and portfolio size relative
to management style considerations, to determine whether some
qualification of our conclusion that divestment has no adverse ef-
fects on portfolio performance is necessary.
a. Transaction Costs
Divestment entails two transaction costs.' First, the one-time
divestment of South Africa-related stocks and the subsequent
purchase of substitute South Africa-free stocks result in transaction
costs. Second, divestment causes ongoing, repetitive transaction
costs attributable to differences in the management of a South Af-
rica-free portfolio and an unconstrained portfolio.
In 1983, Loeb surveyed transaction costs associated with block
trades.' 6 He found that both the market spread component of
transaction costs and total transaction costs were inversely related
to market capitalization. 66 As market capitalization declined, the
spread and transaction costs rose sharply. Furthermore, as the ra-
tio of block size traded to market capitalization rose, transaction
costs increased. While these relationships are intuitively not sur-
prising, the accuracy of Loeb's data affects the divestment debate.
Table 7, which follows, is an excerpt from Loeb's study. 1 67
Using Loeb's data, Wagner, Emkin, and Dixon computed the
164 The total transactions costs of trading stocks on a national exchange equal the
sum of brokerage commissions, market maker spreads, and price concessions. Broker-
age commissions are the price of making stock trades. The market maker's spread is the
bid-ask spread for a one hundred share (round lot) transaction. The price concessions
represent the incremental cost of trading more than one hundred shares. Significant
disagreement exists over the actual magnitude of transactions costs.
165 Loeb, Trading Cost: The Critical Link Between Investment Information and Re-
sults, 39 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 39 (May-June 1983).
166 Id. at 42. This finding is consistent with that of Stoll and Whaley, supra note 160,
at 59.
167 If accurate, Table 7 shows that the cost to extremely small firms of trading very








Block Size of Trade
(millions of dollars) Spread $25,000 $500,000 $2,500,000
50-75 1.86% 5.8% 16.9% 31.5%
500-1,000 0.76% 2.0% 4.0% 7.7%
Over 1,500 0.52% 1.2% 1.7% 2.8%
SOURCE: Loeb, Trading Cost: The Critical Link Between Investment Information and
Results, 39 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 39, 42 (May-June 1983).
transaction cost of divesting hypothetical portfolios of all South Af-
rica-related stocks. 168 Wagner used the S&P 500 as the original
portfolio and replaced each of the 152 South Africa-related stocks
with its largest South Africa-free industry substitute. Because Wag-
ner replaced each divested stock with its closest substitute, in terms
of both size and industry type, the resulting alternative portfolio
closely resembled the original portfolio. Assuming equal dollar
weighting of stocks within the portfolio, 169 Wagner estimated the
transaction costs of divestment and redeployment for three different
size assumptions of the South Africa-related positions. Their re-
sults appear in Table 8, which follows.
TABLE 8
AVERAGE TRANSACTIONS COST (AS A PERCENTAGE OF
THE SIZE OF THE POSITION)
Position Size
$25,000 $250,000 $2,500,000
Divestment of South Africa-related
stocks 0.8% 1.0% 2.3%
Replacement with South Africa-free
stocks 1.0% 1.5% 3.7%
SOURCE: Wagner, Emkin & Dixon, South African Divestment: The Investment Issues,
40 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 14, 18 (Nov.-Dec. 1984).
Wagner's hypothetical results have implications for both types of
transaction costs involved in divestment. First, the initial divest-
ment and redeployment costs can be quite large in some circum-
stances. Second, South Africa-free stocks are more costly to trade
168 Wagner, Emkin & Dixon, supra note 7 [hereinafter Wagner].




than South Africa-related stocks because they have, on average,
smaller equity capitalizations.
Grossman and Sharpe found trading costs substantially lower
than Wagner's calculations indicated.1 70  Grossman and Sharpe
performed a similar divestment and redeployment exercise. They
assumed a $1 billion portfolio and divested the thirty-seven percent
market value position in the portfolio that represented South Af-
rica-related stocks. 7' Estimated transaction costs equaled 2.57%
of the aggregate divestment amount.1 72 Transaction costs were
0.95% of the entire portfolio.173
Grossman and Sharpe's key assumption was that securities would
be divested and the money reinvested on the basis of market value
percentages rather than Wagner's equal weighting percentages.17
4
Grossman and Sharpe estimated that Wagner's equal weighting as-
sumption erroneously increased the overall transaction costs for
their market value weighted portfolio from 0.95% to 2.28%. 175 In
short, Grossman and Sharpe concluded that Wagner's artificial
weighting scheme erroneously overstated the actual transaction
costs a typical portfolio manager would incur as a result of
divestment.
Furthermore, Grossman and Sharpe questioned the accuracy of
Loeb's data. They noted that the dealers responding to Loeb's sur-
vey did not consider the hypothetical investors' trading motives.' 7 6
A dealer's price concessions and spreads depend on, among other
things, whether the dealer is interacting with an "insider." To pro-
tect themselves, dealers increase spreads and demand greater con-
cessions if they believe they are interacting with an insider who may
have superior information. Grossman and Sharpe believed that
Loeb's cost estimates included information-motivated spreads and
concessions which caused the data to overstate the cost of trading in
170 The differences between the South Africa-free replacement costs and South Af-
rica-related divestment costs reflect the repetitive incremental transactions costs in-
curred in South Africa-free portfolios.
171 Grossman & Sharpe, supra note 7, at 21-22.
172The thirty-seven percent figure is the portion of the NYSE index that Grossman




176 The discrepancy is created because an equal weighting scheme causes more of the
portfolio to be committed to small capitalization stocks. Realistically, portfolio funds
are likely to be distributed according to the size of a stock's capitalization.
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situations where no insider trading was suspected. 177 Additionally,
Grossman and Sharpe felt that Loeb's study could have reduced
transaction costs further by spreading the transactions over several
days. 178
Therefore, in response to Loeb's methodology, Grossman and
Sharpe performed an alternative trading costs experiment utilizing a
Wells Fargo Investment Advisors data base of over 36,000 actual
investment transactions made between November 1984 and May
1985.179 The Wells Fargo data base reduced the transaction costs
of divesting and redeploying the previously described $1 billion port-
folio from the earlier estimate of 0.95% to 0.41%.18 Grossman
and Sharpe also used their data to estimate a repetitive incremental
transaction cost differential of only nine basis points per year for a
$100 million value-weighted portfolio which was managed pas-
sively. 8 1 On balance, Grossman and Sharpe argued that transac-
tion costs were much smaller than previously supposed and that
those costs could be recouped by the small firm bias inherent in
South Africa-free portfolios.' 82 If Grossman and Sharpe are cor-
rect, potential transaction costs do not affect our previous conclu-
sion that divestment will not impair portfolio performance.
b. Liquidity Costs
Liquidity costs are price pressure effects resulting from trading
activities. Investors incur liquidity costs when they significantly in-
fluence a stock's price by either liquidating or establishing a large
position in the stock. Because divestment excludes relatively liquid
stocks from a portfolio, divestment increases portfolio liquidity
costs. The IRRC Report suggests that trading levels below twenty
percent of the average daily volume are reasonably free from liquid-
ity costs. 18 3 However, no definitive empirical evidence on the size
or importance of these costs exists. Consequently, the extent to
which divestment will cause increased liquidity costs in South Af-
rica-free portfolios is uncertain. 184
177 Grossman & Sharpe, supra note 7, at 20-21.





183 Id. at 27.




Divestment may also affect administrative costs associated with
research expenses. The IRRC reported that "[a]ctive managers
who rely on security analysts to investigate the return prospects of
stocks will incur higher research costs under divestment because
they will have to follow a larger number of smaller stocks, which
may require more intensive research because little 'street' analysis
exists for them." 185 However, no quantitative evidence exists which
shows the actual impact of divestment on administrative costs.
d. Portfolio Size/Management Style Considerations
Both the management "style" and the size of a portfolio are inter-
related with transactions costs, liquidity costs, and administrative
costs. All other things being equal, the larger and more actively
managed the portfolio, the more adverse the impact of divestment
on portfolio performance.
Larger portfolios, meaning those with assets exceeding $50 mil-
lion, '86 are likely to incur both higher transaction and liquidity
costs under divestment due to the change in equity capitalization
sizes. Additionally, larger funds encounter difficulties when at-
tempting to take substantial positions in firms with small equity
capitalizations. Administrative costs, including research costs, are
probably less sensitive to fund size.
Divestment will probably affect passive and active portfolio man-
agement styles to varying extents. A passive management style in-
volves buying and holding stocks without adjusting the portfolio.
Index funds, for example, are passive; the only trading by such
funds is for the purpose of rebalancing the portfolio. By contrast,
an active management style involves continuous research, investiga-
tion, and trading in an effort to "add value." In very passive portfo-
lios, incremental transactions, liquidity, and administrative costs
resulting from divestment will probably be trivial. In extremely ac-
tively managed portfolios, however, divestment could greatly in-
crease these costs under certain circumstances.
To take one example of the differential effect of divestment on
portfolios with different management styles, consider two funds
with equal turnover rates: the relatively passive fund selects stocks
185 Note that liquidity costs will also be affected by portfolio size and management
style, topics discussed below.
186 IRRC Report, supra note 7, at 27.
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on the basis of mechanical financial screens, like price-to-earnings
ratio, while the relatively active fund selects stocks on the basis of
fundamental research. If divestment causes each fund to increase
its universe of stocks for possible investment, the relatively active
fund is likely to experience larger research costs than the relatively
passive fund because fundamental research is more costly to apply
than mechanical financial screens. Additionally, fundamental re-
search will be especially difficult to apply as portfolio managers con-
sider more small firms for investment.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to determine with precision the
additional costs associated with divestment in actively managed,
large portfolios. If managers with active styles were willing to
adopt more passive strategies, 8 7 these additional costs could be
avoided.
3. Additional Benefits of Divesting
In the preceding discussion, we determined that social investing
neither adversely affected portfolio returns nor increased portfolio
risk. In this section, we advance two potential additional benefits
of divestment.
First, divestment avoids short-run reductions, if any, in returns
from South Africa-related stocks caused by changes in the underly-
ing operating and financial characteristics of South Africa-related
companies. Earlier analyses sometimes assumed that these underly-
ing characteristics of South Africa-related companies would not
change during divestment. This assumption is open to question.
Although definitive data are elusive, United States firms have re-
duced their asset base in South Africa sharply; product and service
boycotts of South Africa-related companies have occurred. Con-
ceivably, these developments could reduce the returns of South Af-
rica-related stocks, particularly in the short run. The extent to
which this will occur, if at all, is difficult to ascertain. Regardless,
187 No clear distinction exists between sizes of equity portfolios; the term "large
fund" is ambiguous in both its general and specific contexts. Trinity Investment Man-
agement Corporation estimated "large" as any fund over about $50 million. IRRC
Report, supra note 7, at 16. Some of the bases for this classification were average daily
trading volume, the estimated percent of daily trading volume a single investor could
initiate without affecting stock price, and the number of days an investor would require
to completely close or open a position. The IRRC Report defined large as somewhere
in the $50 million to $200 million range, depending on other circumstances. Id. at 31.
Grossman and Sharpe, supra note 7, at 20, never defined a large fund but used as an
example a $1 billion fund.
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divestment avoids whatever costs may be associated with maintain-
ing positions in South Africa-related companies.
A second potential benefit of divesting is avoiding the political
and social pressures associated with not divesting. Because
prodivestment advocates are highly vocal, divestment frees both
management and staff from time spent defending fund policies.
This benefit has an economic justification similar to that which sup-
ports out-of-court settlements and the resulting reductions in the
Costs 0 - _ . _ 188
D. Summary
We have now considered the main financial issues associated with
South African divestment. In the crucial area of portfolio risk and
return, we concluded that South Africa-free portfolios can compete
effectively with unconstrained portfolios because South Africa-free
portfolios do not sacrifice return or increase risk. Less constrained
portfolios, such as those that divest stock held in any company do-
ing business in South Africa that does not meet one of the two high-
est Sullivan Principles, definitely will compete effectively with
unconstrained portfolios.
A South Africa-free portfolio could incur some incremental
transaction, liquidity, and administrative costs as a result of divest-
ment. The magnitudes of these costs are related to portfolio man-
agement issues, like the size of the portfolio and the style of
management. The situations in which harm from divestment is
most likely involve very large, actively managed portfolios whose
managers are unable or uninterested in owning relatively small cap-
italization stocks. How large and how actively managed a portfolio
must be before divestment disadvantages a portfolio is a difficult
question to answer. Yet one lesson from the empirical evidence is
that funds as large as $1 billion would have much lower transactions
costs than previously supposed.' 89
188 We recognize that this suggestion would be viewed as heresy by most active
managers.
189 Giving fiduciaries the discretion, within stated limits, to implement social invest-
ing strategies will increase expenses to the extent fiduciaries must allocate time to the
process of deciding which public values merit some kind of investment response. See
supra notes 164-84 and accompanying text. Moreover, just as a defendant's out-of-
court settlement has the potential to encourage additional persons to file claims, which
could lead to costs exceeding the expenses saved by settlement, it is possible that re-
sponding favorably to requests for South Africa divestment may encourage other inter-
est groups to pursue their own causes with more vigor, thereby resulting in additional
costs for the trustee. This concern does not seem substantial, however, since the South
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In the final analysis, however, divestment will only increase
transaction, liquidity, and administrative costs if portfolios contain
a combination of characteristics that portfolio managers refuse to
change. Individually, any single characteristic will probably not
make divestment harmful since a portfolio manager can change any
single characteristic unfavorable to divestment. Essentially, only
the combination of certain portfolio characteristics and the unwill-
ingness of portfolio managers to alter that combination warrants
qualifying our conclusion that divestment does not adversely affect
a portfolio's financial performance.
Two final points are noteworthy. First, empirical studies on so-
cial investing in general, and South Africa divestment in particular,
are not numerous. The most compelling study to date is by Gross-
man and Sharpe, and we have relied on it heavily. It is a finance
study that uses traditional definitions of risk and return. To the
extent future studies use nontraditional measures of risk and return,
it is possible that results different from those reported here could
arise. Nevertheless, we would be surprised if any future research
overturns the current findings.
Second, the strength of the conclusion that South Africa divest-
ment is harmless to portfolios is a function of the severity of the
divestment criteria. If the extreme position of divesting the stock of
any United States firm doing business in South Africa is taken,
there is room for some disagreement concerning the effects of di-
vestment. 190 On the other hand, if a mild divestment position is
taken, such as excluding only South Africa-related United States
firms not ranked in one of the top two Sullivan Principles compli-
ance categories,' 9' it is difficult to envision any room for disagree-
ment as to portfolio effect, based on either existing or future
empirical studies.
IV
RECONSTRUCTING THE PRUDENT INVESTOR TEST IN
LIGHT OF THE FINANCIAL EVIDENCE
The traditional formulation of the prudent investor rule states
that the trustee-investor must put the trust's assets to productive
uses while simultaneously preserving them. The trustee-investor is
Africa divestment that has occurred thus far has not prompted other divestment move-
ments of any significance.
190 Grossman & Sharpe, supra note 7, at 27.
191 See supra notes 165-88 and accompanying text.
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expected to use both skill and judgment to pursue these objectives
for the sole benefit of the trust's beneficiaries. In states that have
enacted the UMIFA, the fiduciary has more flexibility, but the pre-
cise extent of this increased flexibility is unknown. ERISA codifies
the essence of the common law rule. Except in states with statutes
authorizing specific kinds of social investing strategies, the extent to
which a trustee can pursue such a strategy is unclear. The absence
of clear statutory or judicial authority for social investing means
that a trustee who implements such a c, rn- th----e ri- - of violat-
ing his fiduciary duty.192
In Part I, however, we argued that the rules limiting fiduciary
discretion should not be applied in a manner that prohibits a trustee
from implementing social criteria in an investment strategy as long
as the social criteria neither decrease return nor increase risk, and
thus do not compromise the traditional goals of producing income
and preserving the trust's corpus. In Part III we demonstrated that
a social investing strategy no more restrictive than one which avoids
securities of all United States corporations doing business in South
Africa need not impair portfolio performance or increase portfolio
risk. Therefore, even without a special statute authorizing avoid-
ance of all South Africa-related stocks, investor-trustees who adhere
to such a policy of social investing do not violate common law, ER-
ISA, or the less restrictive UMIFA. Similarly, investor-trustees
who adhere to the less severe policy of divesting stock in United
States companies that do not satisfy the top two compliance catego-
ries of the Sullivan Principles, do not violate the common law, ER-
ISA, or the UMIFA. To state the conclusion more generally, social
investing strategies no more restrictive than the most severe form of
South Africa divestment should not constitute a violation of the
common law, ERISA, or the UMIFA.
The qualifier "no more restrictive than the most severe form of
South Africa divestment" is important because divestment reduces
portfolio diversity to some extent. Thus, while a portfolio may suf-
fer no adverse effect from excluding all South Africa-related stocks,
a portfolio may suffer adverse effects by excluding stocks in the
larger number of companies that do business in other socially or
morally offensive ways.' 93 Nevertheless, the zone of social investing
strategies that have no adverse effects is much larger than many
192 Grossman and Sharpe, supra note 7, at 17, estimate that only 7.1% of the total
value of the NYSE would be excluded by divesting only these types of firms.
19 3 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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commentators have previously thought. 194
Our conclusion that social investing no more restrictive than
South Africa divestment has no adverse effects on portfolio per-
formance means that fund managers can implement social invest-
ment strategies without changing the common law's emphasis on
rate of return and corpus safety. Ravikoff and Curzan, however,
would modify the prudent investor rule. They recommend that
courts follow a "corpus preservation" approach-an approach
which emphasizes corpus safety but does not require trustees to
earn an adequate rate of return. 195 Ravikoff and Curzan presuma-
bly sought to facilitate some measure of social investing through a
restatement of what the prudent investor rule is widely understood
to require. Our analysis shows that some range of social invest-
194 These adverse effects could accrue with either positive or negative social investing.
See supra text accompanying notes 11-12. To take an extreme form of positive social
investing, suppose the directors of a pension plan mandate that all of the plan's assets be
invested in firms located within a ten-mile radius of a city. Such a strategy would re-
quire divesting all assets invested in firms outside the designated zone and redeploying
those assets in firms within the zone. Such a strategy might entail unacceptable risk to
the corpus, because a calamity within the zone (e.g., earthquake, volcano, nuclear acci-
dent, toxic chemical spill, or other economic disaster) could jeopardize all of the plan's
assets. By the same analysis, compounding indefinitely a South Africa divestment pol-
icy with other divestment policies (such as divesting stock in all companies that pollute
the environment, employ nonunion labor, contract with the Department of Defense,
violate equal employment opportunity laws, manufacture alcohol and tobacco products,
publish books communicating the values of secular humanism, support the development
of nuclear power, do business in countries that support military activity in Northern
Ireland, support terrorism, disregard women's rights (which rules out companies having
a business tie to a Muslim country), or call themselves "communist") would prevent
maintaining a portfolio of sufficient diversity to achieve a rate of return equivalent to an
unconstrained portfolio, controlling for risk. The point at which the compounding of
divestment policies diminishes return or increases risk cannot be identified with
certainty.
195 See Langbein, supra note 5, at 37, who states, "To bar all alcohol and tobacco
stocks.., has little or no investment implications (because of the modest capitalization
involved unlike, say, oil stocks)." As to alcohol and tobacco stocks, Langbein is plainly
correct. However, since divesting from oil stocks is a less severe strategy than South
Africa divestment, it follows that an oil stock divestment program would have no ad-
verse effects on portfolio performance.
Langbein and Posner, supra note 5, essentially concede our thesis when they state:
But because most of the gains from diversification can be achieved with a
portfolio significantly smaller than the market portfolio or some approxima-
tion thereto such as the S&P 500, it is possible that a portfolio could be con-
structed in which a significant fraction of the largest U.S. firms were ineligible
for inclusion yet which was not grossly underdiversified.
Id. at 87 (footnote omitted). Langbein and Posner suggest that social investing is not
feasible by reasoning that the "consistent" social investor would not stop with South
Africa but would inevitably proceed to "much greater portfolio exclusions [beyond
companies with branches or subsidiaries in South Africa]." Id.
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ing-a range at least as broad as the most restrictive South Africa
divestment strategy-is consistent with the traditional formulation
of the prudent investor rule, thus requiring no restatement of the
traditional rule. Only if fund managers contemplate social investing
policies more severe than the most restrictive South Africa divest-
ment strategy would courts and legislators need to consider refor-
mulating the prudent investor standard along the lines that Ravikoff
and Curzan propose.
Similarly, fund managers can implement social investing without
running afoul of the UMIFA. The UMIFA does not impose
stricter burdens on institutional investors than the common law. If
anything, the UMIFA allows for more flexible investment decisions.
Therefore, South Africa divestment does not violate the prudent in-
vestor rule, and divestment by university endowments and other
similar organizations does not violate the UMIFA.
In addition, our recommendations do not require any change in
ERISA's standards. Fund managers can satisfy ERISA's statutory
prudent investor standards while simultaneously pursuing a strat-
egy of social investing. In 1980, the ERISA Administrator opined
that fund managers could implement a social investing strategy
under conditions of sufficient diversification but that ERISA proba-
bly prohibits systematic exclusion. 96 Our analysis shows that sys-
tematic exclusion of a large part of the investment universe can be
accomplished without sacrificing return and without increasing
risk. If a fund manager may choose a socially preferred investment
when two alternative investments are economically equal, 97 as the
Administrator suggested, a fund manager should also be able to
choose a socially preferred investment strategy when two invest-
19 6 See Ravikoff & Curzan, supra note 5, at 528.
197
[P]roper regard for the requirement of diversification may provide the key to
the social investment puzzle. Fiduciaries have a duty to diversify plan invest-
ments to minimize risk.... If fiduciaries can assure that a broader range of
investment vehicles will be examined, they can more likely also assure that
they will be presented with choices among economically equal but socially
unequal investments.
On the other hand, ruling out certain investments completely, such as non-
union companies or competitors, runs the risk of violating ERISA. It is diffi-
cult to square an investment policy of exclusion on the basis of nonobjective
economic investment criteria.., with ERISA standards that plan assets be
managed prudently, solely in the interest of the participants, and for the exclu-
sive purpose of paying benefits.
Lanoff, supra note 5, at 390-91.
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ment strategies are economically equal.198
The foregoing analysis does not alleviate all of the inherent un-
certainty in existing law regarding the permissibility of social invest-
ing. Without specific statutory clarification, the investor-trustee
who has implemented a social investing strategy is still vulnerable
to a suit alleging breach of the duty of prudent investing and the
duty of loyalty, and perhaps alleging violation of statutory law. In-
deed, the proposition that courts should apply current legal rules to
permit social investing within designated parameters would provide
little solace to the investor-trustee who suffered the litigation costs
of defending against breach of trust allegations.
Thus, in the final analysis, legislative bodies should clarify the
existing law regarding social investing by explicitly authorizing
"constrained social investing."199  Currently, the rules setting the
limits of fiduciary discretion are ambiguous. As a result, social in-
vesting is not likely to occur unless the donor-trustor specifically
insists that the trustee utilize social criteria in investment deci-
sions.2°° If, contrary to the findings in Part III, the data showed
that social investing impaired portfolio performance, courts and leg-
islative bodies should proscribe social investing in the absence of the
198 Hutchinson and Cole, supra note 5, reached the same conclusions: "Assuming
total financial comparability under the prudence standard between two investments and
assuming further that the fiduciary acts without any trace of self-interest or self-vindica-
tion, it is difficult to see any harm in a socially sensitive investment policy that may
produce some extra benefits for the participants." Id. at 1367. Although sensitive to
what they perceived as difficulties in implementing a social investing strategy, see id. at
1367-68, it should be noted that they did not have the benefit of the empirical data upon
which our analysis is based.
199 It is significant that the ERISA's Administrator believed that
a plan policy which excludes investment opportunities for so-called social pur-
poses would be difficult to defend against challenges raised under the "solely
in the interest and exclusive purpose tests-the basic duty of loyalty tests in
ERISA." Thus, the [argument that the investment universe is so big that ex-
cluding a number or class of investments does not violate ERISA] should not
be expected to succeed when subjected to legal analysis of the fundamental
ERISA fiduciary standards.
Lanoff, supra note 5, at 391-92.
If this statement remains true in the face of the analysis that social investing strategies
which exclude South Africa-related companies are equivalent to unconstrained strate-
gies, it must follow that the Administrator's view is incorrect because such a policy is
inconsistent with the "solely in the interest" and "exclusive purpose" tests.
200 Presumably, given enough time, courts could develop a more precise demarcation
of the limits of prudent social investing through the process of Lase-by-case adjudica-
tion. This process is actually already underway. See supra note 20. Yet, the judicial
solution provides scant comfort for the investor-trustee whose defense expenses helped
create a more precise rule.
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trustor's specific authorization. However, the data show that a fund
manager can discharge his traditional duties under the common
law, ERISA, and the UMIFA while implementing a constrained
social investing strategy. Thus, the economic considerations pro-
vide no support for a rule requiring the donor-trustor to authorize
social investing in advance.
Accordingly, legislatures can, within limits, authorize social in-
vesting without financial harm to the retirement fortunes of current
employees or retirees. The same conclusion applies with respect to
other kinds of trusts. Legislatures need not fear that authorizing
social investing will harm the beneficiaries of university endow-
ments, charitable trusts, and other foundations. 20 1
Even granting that constrained social investing entails no disad-
vantages for the productivity and safety of trust assets, state legisla-
tures might still hesitate to authorize social investing on the ground
that trustees simply should not take social, political, and moral
preferences into account when managing a trust. However, trustees
must employ some sort of criteria when choosing among alternative
investments. Foreclosing resort to noneconomic criteria when in-
vestments or investment strategies are equivalent in terms of return
and risk would incapacitate the trustee. For those concerned that
trustees might use repugnant social, political, or moral investment
criteria, the trust law's public policy doctrine should remedy the
trustee's abuse of discretion.202
Finally, authorizing social investing within stated parameters
does not mean that it will in fact occur. Donors and trustors would
still be free to specify trust fund investments and these specifications
could include prohibitions on social investing. Our recommenda-
tion that the status quo's "default rule" be changed from "no social
investing" to "social investing is allowed within stated parame-
201 The current pattern of South Africa divestment by university endowment funds,
see supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text, is arguably an exception to this general-
ization. Some of these divestments no doubt occurred in jurisdictions adhering to the
more liberal rules of the UMIFA. See supra notes 64-75 and accompanying text. In
other divestments, the funds probably concluded that the risk of a successful legal chal-
lenge was small, given the limitations imposed on plaintiffs by standing doctrines. See
supra note 31. In still other divestments, the funds probably concluded that their ac-
tions would be viewed favorably by those closely connected to the funds, and therefore
the risk of legal challenge was slight.
202 Murphy, supra note 5, at 218. "If two investments are financially comparable,
there can be no objection on economic grounds to the selection of the investment that
produces utility gains for nonplan participants, since there is no loss to plan participants
or the plan sponsor." Id. (footnote omitted).
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ters"2 ° a would irrevocably affect only those trustors who have no
control over the discretion of the trustee.
The only remaining issue concerns how to articulate the parame-
ters for a social investing strategy which does not require the trus-
tor's explicit authorization. Unfortunately, due to the lack of
empirical evidence regarding the costs of divestment, it is impossi-
ble to articulate a definitive test that determines when social invest-
ing is or is not permissible.2" However, for the time being,
legislatures inclined to authorize or require divestment of South Af-
rica-related stocks should not refrain from doing so if their only
concern is for the economic performance of the divested portfolios.
Similarly, legislatures should not ignore future calls for divestment
on other issues as long as the effects on diversification are no more
severe than the most restrictive South Africa divestment policy.
Beyond authorizing specific divestments in appropriate situa-
tions, legislatures should also consider articulating threshold stan-
dards for the presumptive validity of social investing strategies. For
example, financial evidence shows that a South Africa divestment
strategy excluding approximately forty percent of the New York
Stock Exchange and the S&P 500 by market capitalization entails
no material adverse effects on portfolio performance.2 "5 Thus, a
legislature might enact a statute that declares presumptively valid
any social investing plan that excludes no more than forty percent
of the New York Stock Exchange or S&P 500 by market capitaliza-
203 Social, political, and moral preferences can, of course, be diverse: a trustee given
the discretion to follow a social investing strategy conceivably might choose to favor
racist, sexist, or illegal organizations, or choose an investment strategy that promotes
ends inconsistent with public policy. This situation occasionally arises when trustors
establish trusts for purposes inconsistent with public policy. On numerous occasions,
courts have found certain trusts to be invalid on the ground that their enforcement
would offend public policy. See, e.g., Liberman v. Liberman, 279 N.Y. 458, 18 N.E.2d
658 (1939) (condition to bequest that beneficiary marry only with consent of his brother
and sister is against public policy); Bettinger v. Bridenbecker, 63 Barb. 395 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1865) (trust which provided that funds would be paid to beneficiary on condition
that criminal action against trustor would be abandoned was invalid); Hill v. Upper,
119 Wash. 62, 204 P. 1055 (1922) (testator's bequest directing that physicians in medi-
cal school use certain obsolete treatises as textbooks held illegal). See generally I A.
ScoTr, supra note 32, §§ 62-62.15; 4 A. ScoTr, supra note 31, § 377. Under the same
logic that a settlor cannot establish a trust for purposes inconsistent with public policy
(that is, which departs from moral and ethical societal norms) a trustee presumably can
not, under the guise of "social investing," adopt an investment strategy designed to
secure objectives inconsistent with public policy.
204 The "default rule" specifies what the trustee is permitted to do in the absence of a
specific directive from the donor-trustor.
205 See supra notes 164-86 and accompanying text.
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tion and otherwise satisfies important financial qualifiers identified
earlier (such as portfolio size, management style, and pace of divest-
ment). The statute could then place the burden on the person
challenging the social investing strategy to show by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the particular divestment's unique circum-
stances will impair portfolio performance relative to other
investment strategies not similarly constrained. The presumption
simply acknowledges that social investing on a limited scale need
neither impair a portfolio's rate of return nor increase its risk.
Therefore, a person challenging the trustee's exercise of discretion
should be required to show that the trustee's investment strategy is
inconsistent with his fiduciary duties. A lower threshold for divest-
ment, such as twenty percent, might be used to create a conclusive
presumption that a trustee did not violate his fiduciary duties by
pursuing a social investing strategy, since divestment at those levels
seems eminently safe.

